A RETURN TO EYES ON THE PRIZE: 
LITIGATING UNDER THE RESTORED 
NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

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“The Legislature, by enacting an amendment of a statute chang­
ing the language thereof, is deemed to have intended a material 
change in the law.”

—New York Statutes, Construction of Amendments

“The courts in construing a statute should consider the mischief 
sought to be remedied by the new legislation, and they should 
construe the act in question so as to suppress the evil and ad­
vance the remedy.”

—New York Statutes, Construction of Amendments

INTRODUCTION

Fifteen years ago, in 1991, New York City enacted comprehen­
sive reforms to its local Human Rights Law in order to fight a civil 
rights counter-revolution that was already restricting civil rights 
protections on the national level. These reforms never achieved 
their potential, a failure due, in significant measure, to the unwill-

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2. Id. § 95.
4. In 1991, the United States was in the third year of generally conservative judicial appointments by President George Herbert Walker Bush, an administration that followed directly eight years of highly conservative appointments by President Ronald Reagan. The concern from those who believed in vigorous civil rights enforcement was not limited to national developments: “Even on the state level,” then Mayor David N. Dinkins stated, “narrow interpretations of civil rights laws have retarded progress.” Remarks by Mayor David N. Dinkins at Public Hearing on Local Laws 1 (June 18, 1991) [hereinafter Mayor David N. Dinkins, Remarks] (on file with the New

255
ingness of judges to engage in an independent analysis of what interpretation of the City Human Rights Law would best effectuate the purposes of that law.\(^5\) This unwillingness has not been an isolated phenomenon. On the contrary, virtually every judge who has presided over a City Human Rights Law matter has simply asserted that the City Human Rights Law was nothing more than a carbon copy of its federal and state counterparts.\(^6\)

The recent enactment of the Local Civil Rights Restoration Act ("Restoration Act")\(^7\) reflects the New York City Council's concern that the City Human Rights Law "has been construed too narrowly."\(^8\) The law explicitly rejects the "carbon copy" theory: "In particular, through passage of this local law, the Council seeks to underscore that the provisions of New York City's Human Rights Law are to be construed independently from similar or identical provisions of New York state or federal statutes."\(^9\)

The Restoration Act proceeds along two basic tracks. One track consists of a series of amendments to particular sections of the law. These amendments are significant in and of themselves and in terms of understanding the direction in which the Council wishes to see the law proceed. These amendments expand retaliation protection, raise the maximum civil penalties that may be awarded in proceedings brought administratively,\(^10\) protect domestic partners

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5. In fairness, advocates for victims of discrimination must also take responsibility for the stunted state of City Human Rights Law. On far too many occasions, courts have not been asked to engage in this independent analysis. 6. More often than not, the assertion is set out in a footnote. When the assertion is in the body of a decision, the proposition is set out in brief, conclusory terms without any discussion. E.g., Payne v. MTA New York City Transit Authority, 349 F. Supp. 2d 619, 629 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Since claims brought under the State HRL and City HRL are analyzed under the same substantive standards as claims brought under Title VII, summary judgment is granted in favor of defendant with respect to [plaintiff's] state and local law claims, as well.").


8. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 1.

9. Id.

10. Unlike Title VII, the City Human Rights Law permits an aggrieved party to seek administrative enforcement through the City's Human Rights Commission or judicial enforcement through the bringing of a court action. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-109, 8-502(a). Judicial actions may be brought directly; administrative
against all forms of discrimination proscribed by the law, require administrative investigations to be thorough, and restore the availability of attorney’s fees in catalyst cases. I defer exploration of these amendments until Part II of this article only because it is the Restoration Act’s other track that is intended to be transformative.

That second track is designed to eliminate the mechanism by which judges have failed to give the local law the expansive interpretation that the Council has intended. The Act states that provisions of state and federal civil rights statutes should be viewed “as a floor below which the City’s Human Rights law cannot fall, rather than a ceiling above which the local law cannot rise.” This ought not be a revolutionary proposition. That idea, after all, has found explicit statutory expression for forty years. Nevertheless, the reality is that there has been very little independent development of the local law, even in circumstances where the language of a specific City Human Rights Law provision varies from that of its federal or state counterpart.

The Act also amends section 8-130, the construction provision of the City’s Human Rights Law, something the 1991 amendments had not done. In so doing, the Restoration Act takes direct aim at the premises and practices that have underlain interpretations of the statute. The construction provision—which is an operative provision as much as any other section of the law—is revised as follows (additions italicized; deletions bracketed):

The provisions of this [chapter] title shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal or New York State civil and human rights laws, including those laws with provisions comparably-worded to provisions of this title, have been so construed.

Assertions that the purposes of the City Human Rights Law are no broader than those other civil rights laws are simply not tenable filing is not a prerequisite. Id. Rather than civil penalties, judicial actions provide for uncapped punitive damages. Id.

11. The City Human Rights Law’s proscriptions include those barring discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations.

12. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 1.


14. See discussion infra notes 33–90 and accompanying text.

15. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 7.
in the face of this amendment. Likewise, the practice of robotically importing interpretations of federal and state civil rights statutes is inconsistent with the demand that liberal construction analysis must be performed without the result of that analysis being restricted or supplanted by the fact that federal and New York state civil rights laws have reached a result less friendly to victims of discrimination.

There are three crucial consequences of the Restoration Act’s declaration of independence. First, there will be no warrant to ratchet down the protections of the City Human Rights Law in the likely event that federal and state civil rights protections are constricted further. Indeed, the legislative history of the Restoration Act makes clear that the Council thought that federal and state civil rights laws had, by 1991, already been narrowed too far.

Second, areas of the law that have been treated as settled under City Human Rights Law, because they are settled for purposes of the counterpart statutes, will now be reopened for argument and analysis. This result follows directly from the Restoration Act’s intention that decisions that have failed to construe City Human Rights Law provisions independently and robustly are not to be treated as controlling, and may only be afforded persuasive weight in limited circumstances. As such, advocates will be able to argue afresh (or for the first time) a wide range of issues under the City’s Human Rights Law, including the parameters of actionable sexual harassment, the vitality of protection against discrimination on the basis of marital status, the availability of a remedy for those persons with disabilities who need what the Second Circuit has characterized as “economic accommodations,” and the appropriate scope of damages.

Third—and this consequence is, unfortunately, of more moment than might at first be apparent—the Restoration Act’s removal of the crutch of assumed equivalence will persuade more judges to take a look at the actual language of specific provisions of the City’s Human Rights Law. Doing so will cause them to see more differences with federal and state law—including differences in the areas of individual liability, vicarious liability, punitive damages, availability of compensatory damages in mixed motive cases, the nature of burden shifting in disparate impact cases, the scope of

16. This will mean, for example, that the broad standing that currently exists for fair housing organizations will not be able to be abridged. See discussion infra notes 274–85 and accompanying text.

17. See discussion infra notes 91-116 and accompanying text.
“public accommodations,” and the obligation of a housing provider to make and pay for reasonable modifications—than they have previously taken the time to recognize.

It turns out—as the legislative history of the Restoration Act demonstrates—that the City Council had all three consequences unmistakably in view when passing the bill.\textsuperscript{18} Will judges, consistent with the principles of statutory construction cited at the head of this article, be prepared to recognize that the City Council “intended a material change in the law,” even where the changes are more far-reaching than they themselves would have enacted? Will they consider the “mischief to be remedied by the new legislation,” even if they personally believe that the remedy is actually the mischief? Will they “construe the act in question so as to suppress the evil and advance the remedy,” even if their own views of what discrimination law should be are aptly summarized by the motto: “defendants are already too burdened”? No legislation ever devised has provided a one hundred percent guarantee against judicial lawlessness, and so an article written in the immediate aftermath of the passage of the Restoration Act cannot set forth the answers to these questions with certainty.

Some things are clear, however. Any judge who takes seriously the principle that a court must honor the will of the legislature now faces a new reality and an important challenge. The need today for the development of the provisions of the City Human Rights Law by the process of judicial decision-making is not unlike the need for the development of the provisions of Title VII by the process of judicial decision-making which followed the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.\textsuperscript{19} Any civil rights advocate who is dispirited with national developments can seek to take advantage of the opportunities for the expansion of civil rights protections offered by the Restoration Act: (1) directly in New York City, by embarking on litigation that has been effectively foreclosed elsewhere; or (2) in other states and municipalities where there is the political will to insist that anti-discrimination laws be interpreted robustly, by seeking to pass similar legislation to make real the protections of civil rights law.

\textsuperscript{18} See discussion infra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{19} It is true that many aspects of federal anti-discrimination law that were entirely developed by judicial interpretation are handled by specific statutory provisions of the City Human Rights Law. Even so, remarkably few provisions of City Human Rights Law have received thoughtful and independent analysis at any time.
President Lincoln said—140 years ago—“let us strive on to finish the work we are in.”\textsuperscript{20} That task is still not completed; it is time that we got back to work.

\textbf{PART I: BROAD, ROBUST, AND INDEPENDENT INTERPRETATION}

\textbf{A. Sources for Construction}

To understand the intent and consequences of the Restoration Act, one begins, of course, with the text of the statute itself,\textsuperscript{21} but one must also consider the Act’s legislative history. One key source was the report submitted to the full Council by the Committee on General Welfare, the committee from which the Restoration Act emerged.\textsuperscript{22}

Another key source was statements made when the full Council considered and passed the bill at its meeting of September 15, 2005. At that meeting, Council Member Annabel Palma, a member of the Committee on General Welfare, brought the attention of her colleagues to the intent and consequences of the legislation:

Insisting that our local law be interpreted broadly and independently will safeguard New Yorkers at a time when federal and state civil rights protections are in jeopardy.

There are many illustrations of cases, like \textit{Levin} on marital status, \textit{Priore[,] McGrath} and \textit{Forrest} that have either failed to interpret the City Human Rights Law to fulfill its uniquely broad purposes, ignore the text of specific provisions of the law, or both.

With Intro. 22, these cases and others like them, will no longer hinder the vindication of our civil rights.

The work of the Anti-Discrimination Center was particularly important to the development and passage of this bill, and its testimony is an excellent guide to the intent and consequences of legislation we pass today.

Statements from the Brennan Center and the Association of the Bar were also important to the Committee. I have copies of all three and invite my colleagues to take a look at them and review them.

\textsuperscript{20} President Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865).
\textsuperscript{21} The Restoration Act was introduced as “Int. 22” (in the nomenclature of the City Council, a bill is referred to by its “Intro” number); the amended version that was passed by the Committee and then by the Council was referred to as “Int. 22-A.”
And I would also like that a copy of each be placed in the record for today's Stated Meeting.\footnote{Annabel Palma, Statement at the Meeting of the New York City Council 41–42 (Sept. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with the office of the New York City Clerk). Council Member Bill deBlasio, the Chair of the Committee on General Welfare, emphasized that "localities have to stand up for their own visions" of "how we protect the rights of the individual," regardless of federal and state restrictiveness. Bill deBlasio, Statement at the Meeting of the New York City Council 47 (Sept. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with the New York City Clerk's Office). Council Member Gale Brewer, the chief sponsor of the Restoration Act, stated that she wanted to reiterate the comments of Council Members Palma and deBlasio, and that it was important to make sure that civil rights protections "are stronger here than [under] the State or federal law." Gale Brewer, Statement at the Meeting of the New York City Council 48–49 (Sept. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with the New York City Clerk's Office).


In addition to the Center Testimony, Brennan Statement, and Bar Letter referred to in the referred to in Council Member Palma's statement regarding the intent and consequences of the legislation—the items directly and explicitly brought to the full Council's attention before the vote on the bill—additional testimony had been taken at General Welfare Committee hearings from a variety of civil rights and allied groups who supported the bill.\footnote{Ironically, the only testimony against the bill at any of its hearings was that from representatives of the New York City Commission on Human Rights.}

Finally, it is clear that the thrust of the 1991 amendments to the City's Human Rights Law needs to be considered if one is to understand the Restoration Act: “Prop. Int. 22-A,” explains the 2005 Committee Report, “aims to ensure construction of the City's Human Rights Law in line with the purposes of the fundamental amendments to the law enacted in 1991.”

What is striking about each of these sources—the Restoration Act's text, the 2005 Committee Report, Council Member statements, the testimony and statements cited to the full Council, addi-
tional hearing testimony, and the 1991 Amendments— is that they are all remarkably consistent. In short, they convey, individually and in the aggregate, a vision that the City's Human Rights Law must meld the broadest vision of social justice with the strongest law enforcement deterrent, and that the judges interpreting the law take its protections to the furthest reaches of what is constitutionally permissible.

**B. The Mischief to be Remedied**

Federal and state courts routinely import federal or state standards when dealing with a city's human rights law, a practice that has continued unabated over the years.26

The practice of automatic importation—or rote parallelism—undermines proper administration of the City Human Rights Law. The practice was unwarranted for three principal reasons, which are discussed in turn below.

1. **Rote parallelism disregards the City's intent in passing the 1991 Amendments**

   The legislative history of the 1991 Amendments explicitly conveyed the local desire to have the City Human Rights Law construed robustly. For example, then Mayor Dinkins stated that “it is the intention of the council that judges interpreting the City’s Human Rights Law are not to be bound by restrictive state and federal rulings and are to take seriously the requirement that this law be liberally and independently construed.”27

   The Committee Report that accompanied the 1991 Amendments, noting that the legislation would “put the city’s law at the forefront of human rights laws,” went on to state that, “[f]aced with restrictive interpretations of human rights laws on the state and federal levels, it is especially significant that the city has seen fit to

26. See e.g., Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 122 n.2 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Our consideration of claims brought under the state and city human rights law parallels the analysis used in Title VII claims.”) (quoting Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 565 n.1 (2d. Cir. 2000)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1016 (2003); Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 819 N.E.2d 998, 1007 n.3 (N.Y 2004) (internal citations omitted) (“The standards for recovery under the New York State Human Rights Law . . . are the same as the federal standards under [T]itle VII . . . Further, the human rights provisions of the New York City Administrative Code mirror the provisions of the [State Human Rights Law] and should therefore be analyzed according to the same standards.”).

27. Mayor David N. Dinkins, Remarks, supra note 4, at 1.
strengthen the local human rights law at this time.”

It also stated that “particular attention should be given” to the construction section of the law.

Unfortunately, the Council made no changes to the text of the construction provision itself except to remove language dealing with the issue of election of remedies. This meant that there was no ready textual flag in the law to alert judges that a different regime was intended. Worse, because there was no private right of action under the City Human Rights Law until the enactment of the 1991 Amendments, and because judicial actions were not permitted to be commenced until nine months thereafter, the temptation was overwhelming to shy away from developing a new body of law, and instead to rely on what had been twenty eight years of development of federal employment discrimination law and twenty four years of development of federal housing discrimination law, not to mention an even longer period during which the provisions of the State Human Rights Law and the City Human Rights Law were, in fact, largely identical.

The lack of modifications to the text of the construction provision gave the State Court of Appeals a means by which to ignore the intention of the 1991 Amendments: the court ultimately dismissed the language of the Committee Report cited above as statements which “merely reflect the broad policy behind the local law to discourage discrimination.”

2. Rote parallelism ignores the liberal construction that has long been required

The “liberal construction” requirement was not a new invention of the 1991 Amendments. The requirement, as mentioned earlier, had already been a part of the City Human Rights Law. An identically-worded requirement had long been incorporated into the

29. Id.
30. The provision, previously codified as section 8-112 of the New York City Human Rights Law, was redenominated section 8-130. See 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 175.
State Human Rights Law. Indeed, in interpreting cases arising under the State Human Rights Law, the Court of Appeals used to recognize that: “Analysis starts by recognizing that the provisions of the Human Rights Law must be liberally construed to accomplish the purposes of the statute. . . .”

The idea that federal civil rights laws provide a floor below which other laws cannot fall, not a ceiling above which they can rise, is not a new invention either. Title VII, for example, provides that:

Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any State or political subdivision of a state, other than any such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.

Sometimes, federal law has been used to provide useful guidance consistent with the liberal construction requirement. In In re Aurecchione v. New York State Division of Human Rights, for example, the Court of Appeals examined the question of whether pre-determination interest was available under the State Human Rights Law, notwithstanding the fact that the law makes no explicit reference to pre-determination interest. In the context of recognizing that “a liberal reading of the statute is mandated to effectuate the statute’s intent,” the Court of Appeals itself considered what result would best further the State Human Rights Law’s purpose of making a victim whole. Reviewing a Supreme Court case that considered Title VII’s purpose in making a victim whole, the Court of Appeals noted that federal case law in this area “proves helpful to the resolution of this appeal,” and ruled that the award of pre-judgment interest was appropriate in the case.

33. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 300 (McKinney 2005).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2005); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-6(b) (public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); 3615 (Fair Housing Act); 12201(b) (Americans with Disabilities Act).
37. Id. at 233.
39. Aurecchione, 771 N.E.2d at 233. The Court of Appeals in Aurecchione (albeit in the context of comparing federal law with State not City Human Rights Law) was already relying on a consistent interpretation of state and federal civil rights laws in view of broad areas of similarity between them. In Aurecchione, though, the Court
The problem is that the seeking of guidance has morphed into rote parallelism, diverting judges from the task of determining what interpretation of the statute best achieves its purposes. Whereas Aurreccchione drew on a federal case because that federal case persuasively addressed the “make whole” relief about which the Court of Appeals was concerned, the Court of Appeals ignored the statutory obligation of liberal construction altogether in the case of McGrath v. Toys “R” Us, Inc. The court simply assumed that the purposes of federal civil rights law were the same as those of the City Human Rights Law, ignored the fact that the United States Supreme Court case being imported had not examined or purported to examine what result would best fulfill the purposes of federal civil rights law, and did not itself engage in examining the consequences of its ruling on the rights of people who could prove they had been subject to discrimination.

McGrath was a case which posed the question of what standard to apply regarding the award of attorney’s fees where a plaintiff who had proved discrimination to the satisfaction of a jury was only awarded nominal damages. When the City Council passed the 1991 Amendments by which a private right of action was created, and simultaneously enacted an attorney’s fee provision in connection with that private right of action, it was acting in the shadow of the Second Circuit’s then longstanding view that attorney’s fees were available in nominal damages cases.

A year after the City Council had acted, the Supreme Court, in its 5-4 Farrar decision, sharply cut back on the availability of attor-
ney’s fees in cases which result in nominal damages only.\textsuperscript{44} While the Supreme Court acknowledged that the plaintiff who had won a liability verdict was a “prevailing party,” the majority concluded that where the prevailing party only is awarded nominal damages, “the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.”\textsuperscript{45}

Despite the fact that the City Council could not have had the Supreme Court’s not-yet-developed \textit{Farrar} rule in mind,\textsuperscript{46} the Court of Appeals in \textit{McGrath} proceeded to import the \textit{Farrar} standard.\textsuperscript{47} The court’s principle justification for doing so was based on its “general practice of interpreting comparable civil rights statutes consistently, particularly since these broad [state and city] policies are identical to those underlying the federal statutes.”\textsuperscript{48} The court also stated that, if the City Council had disagreed with \textit{Farrar}, it could have amended the City Human Rights Law to say so.\textsuperscript{49}

The premises underlying the \textit{McGrath} decision were faulty and misguided, especially in an era of continuing cutbacks in the reach of federal civil rights protections. As the Brennan Center pointed out to the Council in urging support for the Restoration Act, “the court was wrong to assume that the federal decision relied on had considered whether the restrictive rule furthered the purposes of federal civil rights law.”\textsuperscript{50} In fact, the Supreme Court in \textit{Farrar} did not ever address or purport to address the question of whether its rule would help or hinder the enforcement of civil rights protections.\textsuperscript{51}

Had any analysis been done of the role of attorney’s fees in civil rights litigation, that analysis would have strongly suggested that the \textit{Farrar} rule did not accord with the purposes of federal civil rights law, let alone the purposes of City Human Rights Law. The Senate Report on the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act of

\textsuperscript{45} Id.
\textsuperscript{46} The Court of Appeals reluctantly acknowledged this: “Granted, it is not surprising that the legislative history [of the 1991 Amendments] does not address the \textit{Farrar} rule since the amendments predated \textit{Farrar} by one year.” \textit{McGrath}, 3 N.Y.3d at 433.
\textsuperscript{47} Id. at 434.
\textsuperscript{48} Id. at 433.
\textsuperscript{49} Id. at 433-34.
\textsuperscript{50} Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at 4.
\textsuperscript{51} If the Supreme Court had evaluated that issue, the Court of Appeals would still have had the question of whether the Supreme Court’s evaluation was persuasive in determining what rule met the purposes of the City Human Rights Law, but, in \textit{Farrar}, there was not a question of agreeing or disagreeing with the Supreme Court’s liberal construction analysis—there simply, literally, was no liberal construction analysis.
1976, for example, pointed out that a variety of civil rights laws—including the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (provisions which do not provide for damages)—“depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain.”\(^{52}\) That report made plain how judges were to proceed: “In the civil rights area, Congress has instructed the courts to use the broadest and most effective remedies available to achieve the goals of our civil rights laws.”\(^{53}\)

It is difficult to understand how \textit{Farrar} could accord with the intention of Congress to use “the broadest and most effective remedies available.” Nevertheless, because of the “general practice” of the Court of Appeals to assume that there is federal and local equivalence, the court was blinded to its obligation to scrutinize \textit{Farrar} to see whether in fact the reasoning of that decision was actually helpful in deciding the City Human Rights Law case the Court of Appeals had before it.\(^{54}\)

So much was the Court of Appeals under the spell of rote parallelism, it failed to conduct its own analysis of whether adopting the \textit{Farrar} rule for City Human Rights Law actions would further the purposes of the counterpart guarantees contained in City law. Such an analysis would have had to come to grips with the fact that the Council had in 1991 done the exact opposite of narrowing the cases where fees would be available. It created the private right of action (and accompanying attorney’s fee provision), identified the goal of the City Human Rights Law as preventing discrimination from playing “any role” in actions related to the various activities covered by the law, identified individual prosecution as part of the City’s overall effort to fight discrimination, referred to the availability of fees without indicating that any subcategory of those who had proved discrimination would be denied fees, and did all of

\(^{52}\) S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 5910 (1976).

\(^{53}\) Id. at 5910-11 (emphasis added).

\(^{54}\) The Court and other automatic importers have lost sight of the admonition made almost thirty years ago by the late Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Justice Brennan, writing in the context of state constitutional provisions, cautioned that state court judges “do well to scrutinize constitutional decisions by federal courts, for only if they are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim persuasive weight as guideposts when interpreting counterpart state guarantees.” William J. Brennan, Jr., \textit{State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights}, 90 Harv. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan, Protecting Individual Rights]; see Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at 8.
these things in the context of comprehensive reforms, all of which significantly expanded the reach of the law.55

Liberal construction analysis would have had to come to grips with the difficulties the Farrar rule imposes on persons seeking counsel to vindicate their rights. Describing a case as a “nominal damages case” is an after-the-fact construct. Attorneys, by contrast, need to make decisions about case selection in real time, long before they know whether they will be able to get a jury to award monetary damages. If proving liability is not sufficient to warrant a fee award, they will be discouraged not only from taking on cases where they “know” damages will not be awarded, but from taking on any cases where, though they have no doubt about proving that a defendant discriminated, they may have questions as to whether a plaintiff’s actual damages will be recognized by a jury.56

None of the foregoing was considered, and, as such, a rule was imported without any court having ever engaged in the liberal construction analysis that had been required by section 8-130 of the local Human Rights Law.

The Court of Appeals’ alternative suggestion that the City Council could have changed the attorney’s fees provision—and, therefore, its conclusion that the Council’s failure to do so represents an implicit adoption of the ratcheted down federal standard—is both disingenuous and detrimental to the efficient and effective operation of the City Human Rights Law. The City Council had an explicit provision of law in place—the construction requirement of section 8-130—that it was entitled to have enforced. Both the Council and the Mayor had expressly noted the importance of having that provision enforced. Each had said that federal and state law were already too narrow as of 1991. Just because courts have subsequently failed to meet their obligations to engage in liberal construction analysis is no reason to suppose that the Council af-


56. Cf. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978). In that case, which limited the circumstances under which a losing plaintiff would be vulnerable to paying attorney’s fee to a defendant, the Supreme Court cautioned district courts “to resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success.” Id. at 421-22. In other words, if plaintiffs who had a good faith belief that their rights had been violated faced the risk that not prevailing would expose them to paying the defendant’s attorney’s fees, the resulting chilling effect “would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII.” Id.
firmly believed at any time that \textit{Farrar} was the one area of federal law where the City should go along with the federal civil rights rollback.

What the Court of Appeals was really doing in \textit{McGrath} was providing a formal announcement that the scope and content of the New York City Human Rights Law would always be at the mercy of the latest federal or state retrenchment. Perhaps the Supreme Court will come to embrace the thrust of the 2004 Seventh Circuit decision written by Judge Richard Posner wherein he suggested that the Fair Housing Act is not intended to prohibit post-acquisition harassment in the fair housing context.\footnote{Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The Fair Housing Act contains no hint either in its language or its legislative history of a concern with anything but access to housing."). \textit{Halprin} is now not alone. See, \textit{e.g.}, Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing the quoted \textit{Halprin} language with approval, and rejecting a claim based on impaired "habitability," but not ruling out claims of constructive eviction); see also discussion \textit{infra} notes 268–273 and accompanying text.}\footnote{The protection provided by the Restoration Act against this particular result is discussed \textit{infra} at notes 268–273 and accompanying text.}\footnote{The existing practice of rote parallelism has also meant that other doctrines clearly inconsistent with a liberal construction requirement have become known as "well established" despite the absence of liberal construction analysis, and have thus been effectively shielded from challenge on a local level. For example, very real victims of very real harassment are regularly deprived of the opportunity to have their cases go to a jury because of the requirement—imposed as a matter of federal caselaw—that the victim demonstrate that the harassment is "severe or pervasive." Less burdensome requirements, more consistent with the City Human Rights Law’s twin focus on victim’s rights and maximum deterrence, could easily be developed—see \textit{infra} notes 190–213 and accompanying text—but my research has found no case where a federal or state judge has thus far treated the question of the appropriate standard under City law as anything other than a closed question, already determined by the contours of federal law.} Presto—the City Human Rights Law would, on a \textit{McGrath} analysis, no longer proscribe such conduct either.\footnote{The protection provided by the Restoration Act against this particular result is discussed \textit{infra} at notes 268–273 and accompanying text.} The City Council should not be forced to leap into action to protect the City’s law every time some other law is cut back.\footnote{The protection provided by the Restoration Act against this particular result is discussed \textit{infra} at notes 268–273 and accompanying text.}

3. \textit{Rote parallelism blinded judges to those areas where the City law is textually distinct}

The easy habit of “dropping the footnote” has led judges to misconstrue provisions of the City Human Rights Law on a regular basis, committing either the sin of failing to bother to read the statute, or the sin of failing to believe what they have read.

In \textit{Forrest}, for example, the Court of Appeals, asserting that the provisions of the City Human Rights Law “mirrored” those of the
State Human Rights Law, stated in dicta that, even if the quantum of harassment had been sufficient to be actionable, the defendant would not be liable for its supervisor’s harassment under the State Human Rights Law because an “employer cannot be held liable [under state law] for an employee’s discriminatory act unless the employer became a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it.” The court was apparently contemplating the City Human Rights Law as well, because the footnote to its vicarious liability discussion referenced the availability of the federal Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense under both City and State Human Rights Law in “hostile work environment” cases.

The court correctly set forth the law insofar as it referred to the State Human Rights Law. It ignored, however, the explicit statutory text of section 8-107(13)(b) of the City Human Rights Law, which provides for three separate and independent circumstances under which an employer shall be liable for the conduct of “an employee or agent” that is in violation of the relevant employment discrimination provision of the statute. One of these is where “the employee or agent exercised managerial or supervisory responsibility.” Section 8-107(13)(b)(1) imposes no requirement that the employer encourage, condone, or acquiesce in the conduct. In fact, Totem Taxi, one of the cases cited by Forrest for the

61. Id. at 311.
63. The Court did not deal explicitly with two circumstances where the employer would be automatically liable: (1) where the employee is a proxy of the employer; or (2) where the acts involved are “quintessentially” those of an employer. See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789-90 (person sufficiently high in managerial hierarchy may have his acts imputed to employer; a discriminatory discharge or failure to promote is the act of the employer). Neither of these circumstances was present in Forrest, so the Court of Appeals had no reason to address them.
64. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(13)(b). The relevant substantive provision is section 8-107(1)(a). Note that employers in the housing, public accommodations, and retaliation contexts are strictly liable for the conduct of their employees and agents in all circumstances. Id. § 8-107(13)(a).
65. Id. § 8-107(13)(b)(1).
contrary proposition, was a motivating factor for creating a distinct vicarious liability regime as part of the 1991 Amendments.

It is true that there is a provision of the employer liability section that sets forth an affirmative defense which involves pleading and proving the establishment of, and compliance with, “policies, programs and procedures for the prevention and detection of unlawful discriminatory practices.” This affirmative defense, however, does not apply to the question of liability for the conduct of employees and agents who exercise managerial or supervisory responsibility. It is only relevant to a liability determination in the context of co-employee harassment where the question is whether the employer should have known of the discriminatory conduct and failed to exercise reasonable diligence to prevent such conduct. In other words, the City Council made a different choice in 1991 about liability of supervisors and managers than did the Supreme Court in 1998, but the blinders of rote parallelism prevented the Forrest court from seeing this.

Another egregious example of the “failure to read” problem is a state case posing the question of whether “Work Experience Program” participants were protected against sexual harassment. The judge, believing that participants could not be classified as employees, and asserting that the State and City Human Rights Laws “are limited in applicability to the employment relationship,” dismissed the complaint. In fact, even if the Work Experience Program participants were not employees, they may well have been

67. Forrest, 3 N.Y.3d at 311 (citing In re Totem Taxi, Inc. v. N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 480 N.E.2d 1075 (N.Y. 1985)).
68. “Even on the state level, narrow interpretations of civil rights laws have retarded progress. For example, the State Court of Appeals has made it virtually impossible to hold taxi companies responsible for the discriminatory acts committed by their drivers.” Mayor David N. Dinkins, Remarks, supra note 4, at 1.
70. Section 8-107(13)(e) specifies that section 8-107(13)(b)(3)—the “should have known” about co-employee harassment section—is the only liability determination able to be affected by the establishment of the affirmative defense. It then goes on to provide that the establishment of the affirmative defense shall be considered as a factor in mitigating the amount of punitive damages or civil penalties to be imposed.
71. 1998 was the year that Faragher and Ellerth were decided. By making the affirmative defense only go to mitigation, not elimination, of punitives, it also made a different decision from what the Supreme Court made in Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 527 U.S. 526 (1999). See infra notes 292–302 and accompanying text.
73. Id. at *3. Cf. United States v. City of N.Y., 359 F.3d 83, 91-97 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that New York City work experience program participants are employees within the meaning of Title VII).
covered under the “provider of public accommodations” section and the “training program” sections of the law.\

\textit{Priore v. New York Yankees}^{75} presented a twist on the problem illustrated by the foregoing cases. In \textit{Priore}, the First Department may have read the statute, but apparently did not want to believe what it said. Before the 1991 Amendments, individuals were liable for their own discriminatory acts in the housing and public accommodations contexts, but were not generally liable in the employment context.\textsuperscript{76} The 1991 Amendments took each of the various employment discrimination provisions, all of which had proscribed workplace conduct by “employers,” and expanded each of those provisions to proscribe workplace conduct by the entity “or an employee or agent thereof.”\textsuperscript{77} This was one change that several decisions on both the state and federal level did not seem to have trouble appreciating.\textsuperscript{78} Notwithstanding this, the \textit{Priore} court held that “There is no indication in the local ordinance, explicit or im-\

74. \textit{See N.Y.C. Admin. Code} \textsection{s} 8-102(9), 8-107(2)(c), 8-107(4).
76. Compare the pre-1991 Amendments versions of sections 8-107(5)(a) and 8-107(2) of the New York City Human Rights Law (proscribing conduct by persons in the housing and public accommodations realms, respectively) with the pre-1991 Amendments version of section 8-107(1)(a) (only proscribing conduct by “employers” in the workplace realm). The term “persons,” pre-1991 Amendments, had been defined pursuant to section 8-102(1) to include “individuals” (the 1991 Amendments, \textit{inter alia}, replaced “individuals” with “natural persons”). The provisions cited are contained in 1991 \textit{Leg. Ann.}, \textit{supra} note 3, at 155-56, 153-54, and 152 respectively. The impact of the change is evidenced by the outcome of \textit{In the Matter of the Complaints of Abdalkwy v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives}, Nos. EM00106-4/19/88, EM00104-4/19/88, EM00105-4/19/88, 1991 WL 1288827, *18 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts., June 28, 1991) (decision and order). In this employment case, which arose prior to the 1991 Amendments, the individual discriminator was found not liable because he had neither a financial interest in the employer entity nor the power to do more than carry out decisions made by others. The Administrative Law Judge in her February 25, 1991 Recommended Decision and Order had noted that “[o]nly amendment of the Code by legislation can remedy this problem.” \textit{Id.} at 25 n.4.
77. \textit{N.Y.C. Admin. Code} \textsection{s} 8-107(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d), (2), (3).
78. \textit{See, e.g.}, \textit{Murphy v. ERA United Realty}, 674 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417 (App. Div. 1998) (Section 8-107(1)(a) of the New York City Human Rights Law “expressly provides that it is unlawful for ‘an employer or an employee or agent thereof’ to engage in discriminatory employment practices. Accordingly, the plaintiff has a cause of action under this provision against the employer as well as her coemployees.”); \textit{Lee v. Overseas Shipholding Group}, No. 00 CIV. 9682(DLC), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15355, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2002) (individual liability under City law “regardless of ownership or decision-making power”); \textit{Kojak v. Jenkins}, No. 98 Civ. 4412(RPP), 1999 WL 244098, at *7 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1999) (employment discrimination sections of City law “clearly provide for individual, personal liability”); \textit{Harrison v. Indosuez}, 6 F. Supp. 2d 224, 233-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“As the [City law] specifically allows for employee liability, there is no question that the law is applicable against [the defendant] in his individual capacity.”); \textit{Alvarez v. J.C. Penney Co.}, No. 96 Civ. 5165, 1997 U.S.
plicit, that it was intended to afford a separate right of action against any and all fellow employees based on their independent and unsanctioned contribution to a hostile environment.\textsuperscript{79}

The \textit{Priore} court chose not to pay heed to the relevant portion of then-Mayor Dinkins’ statement in signing the 1991 Amendments:

I myself was surprised to learn that under current local law, an employee who has been the victim of sexual or racial harassment at the hands of a co-worker can sue her employer but cannot sue the co-worker himself. Without the possibility of legal action, co-worker harassment has continued to poison many of our workplaces. \textit{The new law takes the fundamental step of making all people legally responsible for their own discriminatory conduct.}\textsuperscript{80}

The \textit{Priore} court compounded its error by failing to consider the Committee Report accompanying the 1991 Amendments. The report had stated that the pre-Amendments employment discrimination provisions of City law were “silent as to the individual liability of their employees and agents for such practices,”\textsuperscript{81} but the 1991 Amendments, “would make explicit such individual liability.”\textsuperscript{82}

How, then, did the court in \textit{Priore} try to justify its conclusion that there was no individual liability? The court literally had to invent a legislative history. It asserted that, when the City extended liability to “an employer or an employee or agent thereof,” it did so merely “in substitution for the State statute’s ‘employer or licensing agency’.”\textsuperscript{83} In fact, however, section 8-107(1)(a) of the City Human Rights Law did not deal with licensing agencies before the 1991 Amendments, and it did not deal with licensing agencies

\textsuperscript{79.} \textit{Priore}, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
\textsuperscript{80.} Mayor David N. Dinkins, Remarks, \textit{supra} note 4, at 3-4 (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{82.} \textit{Id.}; see also 1991 \textbf{LEG. ANN.}, \textit{supra} note 3, at 187 (documenting contemporaneous memoranda summarizing the impact of the impact of the 1991 Amendments). The law went from having a standard under which an employee was only liable where he or she “had the power to do more than carry out decisions made by others” to a regime where “employees and agents are responsible for their own discriminatory acts.” \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{83.} \textit{Priore}, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
after the 1991 Amendments. 84 There had been a separate provision of the City Human Rights Law that had dealt both with age discrimination by employers and with licensing agencies. 85 The proscription against age discrimination by employers was moved into section 8-107(1)(a); the proscription against age discrimination by licensing agencies was moved into an entirely different section, to join other proscriptions on certain conduct by licensing agencies. 86 Accordingly, the revision to section 8-107(1)(a) did not represent a substitution of language from the State Human Rights Law, it represented an addition of language not found in the State Human Rights Law. 87

To go along with its tale of how the language of the law changed, the Priore court provided a theory of Council intent. It speculated that the Council had only wanted to permit individual liability where the individual had been acting with or on behalf of the employer in some agency or supervisory capacity. 88 The problem is, if that were the Council's purpose, it need not have acted at all: section 8-107(6) of the City Human Rights Law already was broader, providing that it “shall be an unlawful discriminatory act for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter, or to attempt to do so.” 89

The Priore court was surely aware of the basic rule of statutory construction that, “in the interpretation of a statute, the court must assume that the Legislature did not deliberately place in the statute a phrase intended to serve no purpose, but must read each word and give to it a distinct and consistent meaning . . . .” 90 Unfortunately, this knowledge was overborne by the court’s belief that the

84. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(1)(a) (examining both the pre-1991 Amendments version and the version in place after the 1991 Amendments); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 154.
85. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(3-a) (in effect prior to the 1991 Amendments, but deleted by those amendments); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 155.
86. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(1)(a), 8-107(9); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 156, 160.
87. In other words, a proscription on conduct by “employers and employees and agents thereof” was, not surprisingly, intended to have broader effect than a proscription on conduct by “employers” alone. Further proof of the baselessness of the Court's interpretation is found in the fact that the phrase “or employees or agents thereof” was added to each and all of the operative employment discrimination proscriptions, N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(1) and 8-107(2), even one where the phrase modified only the term “labor organization.” Id. § 8-107(1)(c); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 152.
88. Priore, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
89. See 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 160.
90. N.Y. STAT. LAW § 98 (McKinney 2005).
Council should not have wanted to do what it had done. The only “substitution” involved in the case was the court’s insertion of itself as a replacement for the legislative branch of local government.

C. The Rejection of the Rote Parallelism Model: Different Premises; Different Procedure

The Restoration Act renders the rote parallelism model obsolete, and deprives cases decided via that model (and without consideration of liberal construction principles) of any precedential value.

The Restoration Act requires that provisions of the City’s Human Rights Law hereafter be construed liberally to accomplish the “uniquely broad and remedial” purposes of the local law, “regardless of whether federal or New York State civil and human rights laws, including those laws with provisions comparably-worded to provisions of this title, have been so construed.”91 There is much packed into these new phrases; the revised construction section comprises the single most important sentence of the Restoration Act.92

A fundamental premise of McGrath—and of the entire rote parallelism school—was that the purposes of the City Human Rights Law are “identical” to those of its state and federal counterparts.93 That premise is unequivocally rejected: post-Restoration Act local law now provides that its purposes are “uniquely broad and remedial.” This alone makes the application of rote parallelism logically indefensible, and it requires judges to recognize two things. First, since the local law’s purposes are even more broad and remedial than those of state and federal civil rights laws, interpretations of those other laws naturally constitute a floor of rights below which

91. Restoration Act, supra note 7, at 13, amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-130.
92. One seemingly minor change—from requiring liberal construction of the “chapter” containing the substantive provisions of the City’s Human Rights Law to requiring liberal construction of the entire City Human Rights Law “title”—was necessitated by the argument actually advanced by the City Law Department in another Court of Appeals case that liberal construction did not apply at all because the case had been commenced in court pursuant to Chapter 5 of the City Human Rights Law, and that Chapter did not itself have a liberal construction provision. See Brief of Defendant at 2004 WL 1091832, *25-26, Krohn v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 811 N.E.2d 8 (N.Y. 2004) (No. 05-327) (“... section 8-130 limits application of the ‘liberal construction’ provision to chapter one of the [New York City Human Rights Law], entitled ‘Commission on Human Rights.’ Nothing in the New York City Human Rights Law instructs courts to apply a rule of liberal construction to section 8-502(a), the provision creating a private right of action for ‘damages, including punitive damages,’ which appears in chapter five.”).
interpretations of City Human Rights Law should not fall.94 Second, a judge must search out what the broader and more remedial purposes of the City Human Rights Law actually are in order for that judge to assess what potential interpretation of a particular provision would serve the law’s overall purposes best.95

The fundamental procedure of McGrath—and of the entire rote parallelism school—was, by definition, to import interpretations of federal or state civil rights laws automatically. That procedure is unequivocally condemned: the process of liberal construction to accomplish the uniquely broad and remedial purposes of the local law must be allowed to proceed “regardless of whether federal or New York State civil and human rights laws . . . have been so construed.”96 The demand for broad and independent construction came, inter alia, from the Center’s testimony,97 from the Brennan Center Statement,98 and from the Bar Association Letter,99 and is reflected, inter alia, in Council Member Palma’s statement.100 in the

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94. See, e.g., 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5 (“provisions of the human rights law may not be construed less liberally than interpretations of comparably worded federal and state laws”).
95. See discussion infra notes 121–65 and accompanying text regarding how to do so.
96. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 7 amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-130.
97. “In the end, regardless of federal interpretations, the primary task of a judge hearing a City Human Rights Law claim is to find the interpretation for the City law that most robustly further[s] the purposes of the City statute.” Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 6 (emphasis added).
98. The bill would “require judges to interpret the local law independently of any limitations that may have been imposed on its federal and state counterparts.” Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at 1 (emphasis added).
99. “Intro 22-A requires courts to construe the City’s Human Rights Law independently and in light of the Council’s clear intent to provide the greatest possible protection for civil rights.” Bar Association Letter, supra note 23, at 4 (emphasis added).
100. “Insisting that our local law be interpreted broadly and independently will safeguard New Yorkers at a time when federal and state civil rights protections are in jeopardy.” Annabel Palma, Meeting of the New York City Council 41 (Sept. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with the New York City Clerk’s Office) (emphasis added).
2005 Committee Report,\textsuperscript{101} and in Section 1 of the Restoration Act itself.\textsuperscript{102}

Because judges have often thought that the existence of similarly or identically-worded counterparts is reason enough to ignore the requirement of liberal construction, the Restoration Act is careful to state explicitly that the need to proceed independently to find the result that best fits the purposes of the City Human Rights Law must go forward even where the differently-construed federal and state counterparts have provisions “comparably-worded to provisions of this title.”\textsuperscript{103} In the same way that Justice Brennan’s 1977 call for independent analysis in the protection of rights beyond the level protected federally did not exempt state guarantees that linguistically tracked the federal provision,\textsuperscript{104} so the Restoration Act insists on such independent analysis in all circumstances.

What then to do with existing caselaw? The philosophy of the Restoration Act is simply inconsistent with a court hereafter according weight to prior federal or state decisions merely because those decisions spoke to an aspect of City Human Rights Law (or of comparably-worded state or federal law). Each of the statements specifically brought to the full Council’s attention make the point. “[M]any federal decisions,” according to Center testimony, “are not helpful to the interpretative process because those decisions themselves give no consideration to principles of liberal construction.”\textsuperscript{105} The Bar Association Letter similarly pointed out that, “[j]udges interpreting federal law may not necessarily use this

\textsuperscript{101} The bill “explicitly states that the human rights law must be construed \textit{independently} from both federal and New York State civil and human rights law, including laws with comparably worded provisions.” 2005 \textsc{committee report}, \textit{supra} note 22, at 4-5 (emphasis added). The 2005 \textsc{committee report} also incorporates the view expressed by Mayor Dinkins in connection with the passage of the 1991 Amendments: “[I]t is the intention of the Council that judges interpreting the City’s Human Rights Law are not [to be] bound by restrictive state and federal rulings and are to take seriously the requirement that this law be liberally and independently construed.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).

\textsuperscript{102} “In particular, through passage of this local law, the Council seeks to underscore that the provisions of New York City’s Human Rights Law are to be construed \textit{independently} from similar or identical provisions of New York state or federal statutes.” Restoration Act, \textit{supra} note 7, § 1 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{103} Restoration Act, \textit{supra} note 7, § 7, \textit{amending} N.Y.C. \textsc{admin. code} § 8-130.

\textsuperscript{104} Brennan, \textit{Protecting Individual Rights}, \textit{supra} note 54, at 500-01 (citing with approval the many examples then existing “where state courts have independently considered the merits of constitutional arguments and declined to follow opinions of the United States Supreme Court they find unconvincing, \textit{even where the state and federal constitutions are similarly or identically phrased}”) (emphasis added). This point was quoted in the Brennan Center Statement, \textit{supra} note 23, at 8.

\textsuperscript{105} Center Testimony, \textit{supra} note 23, at 6.
principle of liberal construction.”

It bears mention here that another premise of *McGrath* is thus undercut: the fact that a federal or state law has broad purposes does not allow the assumption that a decision construing such a law has actually considered those purposes.

In view of the concerns about the pitfalls of importing decisions that have interpreted counterpart civil rights statutes, the Restoration Act only allows an interpretation of a state or federal civil rights law to be used as an “aid in interpretation” of the City Human Rights Law in two ways. One permissible use is insofar as the interpretation of a similarly-worded state or federal law is viewed “as a floor below which the City’s Human Rights law cannot fall, rather than a ceiling above which the local law cannot rise.” This provision follows both from the traditional notion of federal civil rights protections as a floor, and as a consequence of the Restoration Act’s aim “to ensure construction of the City’s Human Rights Law in line with the purposes of fundamental amendments to the law enacted in 1991.” The 1991 Amendments, as previously discussed, had already seen state and federal law as too constrained, and sought to build beyond those constraints.

As such, the Council knew that while it wanted judges to spend significant time considering the outer limits of how far the law needed to go to best accomplish its purposes, judges could, in general, safely rely on the fact that the Council would not want the local law to be any less protective than the most protective posture of federal or state law as they existed in 1991 or at any time thereafter. In contrast, the interpretation of the counterpart law is emphatically not to be used “to limit or restrict the provisions of this title from being construed more liberally than [the counter-
part] laws in order to accomplish the purposes of the human rights law . . . .”

The second permissible use must be inferred from the purpose of the construction provision, and from the analysis that underlies the Restoration Act. As underlined in section 8-130 of the revised New York City Human Rights Law, the point of the entire exercise is to find the construction that best accomplishes law’s purposes. As such, it is the persuasive value of an opinion that has cogently grappled with how best to achieve the purposes of a counterpart civil rights statute that makes it potentially useful to the analysis of the local law, not the mere fact that the decision announced a result. As Justice Brennan wrote in urging judicial vigilance in the defense of civil rights, it is only where decisions construing rights guaranteed federally have looked at the relevant policies underlying the grant of rights and have considered, in a well-reasoned and logically persuasive way, whether the proposed constructions serve those underlying policies, that such decisions may “properly claim persuasive weight as guideposts” when interpreting counterparts to the federal guarantees.

These two uses are the only ways that existing caselaw may be validly used as precedent. To restate Justice Brennan’s proposition: those decisions that have not looked at the relevant policies, and those decisions which have failed to conduct well-reasoned and logically persuasive analyses, may not properly claim persuasive weight as guidelines in connection with the construction of the City’s Human Rights Law.

112. 2005 Committee Report, supra note 22, at 5.

113. See Bar Association Letter, supra note 23, at 2 (the bill “makes it clear that judges must consider the legislative intent underlying provisions of the Human Rights Law, and ask which interpretation of the law will best fulfill the objectives of the law, rather than adopting, as a matter of course, the prevailing interpretation of similar provisions of federal or state law”) (emphasis added).

114. See Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 5-6 (the reasoning of state and federal opinions construing counterpart statutes “like the reasoning contained in law review articles and other sources . . . can suggest potential interpretations, and, in some situations, will be found to be persuasive by the judge hearing the City Human Rights Law claim”) (emphasis in original).


116. One non-precedential use should be added. While the fact that a particular result (“Interpretation A”) arises from a decision that has failed this test means that the decision has no precedential value, that fact does not mean that a judge may not consider Interpretation A along with plaintiff’s proposed result (“Interpretation B”), defendant’s proposed result (“Interpretation C”) (likely Interpretation A in disguise), and the judge’s own tentative result (“Interpretation D”). The judge would not adopt Interpretation A, however, unless it was the interpretation that best fulfilled the purposes of the local law.
It should not be necessary to belabor further the fact that the Restoration Act stands as a rejection for McGrath and its ilk. The 2005 Committee Report specifically states that the amendment to section 8-130 of the New York City Human Rights Law is designed to overcome McGrath. But it is important to note one final aspect of McGrath—its Council-should-just-fix-specific-provisions theory—and explain why the Restoration Act intended that this kind of theory should not again rear its ugly head. First, unlike in 1991, the Council did with the Restoration Act modify a specific provision—section 8-130—to reflect its desired mode of construction. Second, the design of the Restoration Act completely rebuts McGrath’s premise that Council inaction in respect to an unduly narrow judicial interpretation of a particular substantive provision of the City Human Rights Law can fairly be interpreted as implicit ratification of that judicial error.

The Council could have limited itself to the particular substantive and procedural fixes discussed in Part II of this article. It chose not to do so. It saw that the law had been construed too narrowly, that the process of narrowing was ongoing, and that even the use of distinct language in the statute had not been sufficient to protect the law. It thus developed a solution that was designed to accommodate more than the specific fixes set out in other sections of the Restoration Act, and more than the numerous other problematic areas of law that had been brought to the Council’s attention. In short, it developed a process of reflection and reconsideration (the requirement of independent construction) that is intended to serve as a continuing shield and sword for the City Human Rights Law in all its dimensions.

Nothing in the language of section 8-130 of the New York City Human Rights Law limits the requirement of broad and indepen-

117. 2005 Committee Report, supra note 22, at 4-5. Indeed, the version of Intro 22 that was ultimately enacted had stronger language than the original, pre-McGrath version. The original version is found at New York City Council Proceedings 2004 338-40 (Feb. 4, 2004). The characterization of the local law’s purposes as “uniquely broad and remedial” was added later, as was the unequivocal statement that local law construction needed to proceed “regardless” of how federal or state law had been construed. 2005 Committee Report, supra note 22, at 4-5. The Restoration Act’s first version had no initial “purpose” section; only the final version had an initial “purpose” section that underlined both the need for independent construction and the idea of comparable civil rights laws as a floor below which the City law cannot fall, not a ceiling above which it may not rise. Id. at 5.

118. Cf. N.Y. Stat. Law § 95 cmt. (“A statute framed in language of general import, not only may be deemed applicable to temporary existing evils, but may be construed to meet those which subsequently arise.”).
dent construction to particular provisions; when the 2005 Committee Report refers to the need to defend the “protections” of the City Human Rights Law against “restrictive interpretations,” it uses the term “protections” without limitation. As advocates made clear to the City Council, the revised construction provision should obviate the need to fix specific substantive provisions over and over again. “Amendments such as these,” wrote the Association of the Bar, “should no longer be necessary after Intro 22-A is enacted because Intro 22-A requires courts to construe the City’s Human Rights Law independently and in light of the Council’s clear intent to provide the greatest possible protection for civil rights.”

D. Providing Guidance

There is nothing mysterious about what judges need to do to fulfill the legislative intent of the Restoration Act. Step one is to revive the tradition of liberal construction that used to prevail routinely. Step two is to adapt that tradition to a statute whose structure, language, and intent all point to a body of law far less concerned with preserving the prerogatives of covered entities, and far more concerned with preventing and punishing discrimination in all its manifestations (and with compensating victims of such acts), than are the counterpart federal and state statutes. Step three is to heed the specific guidance generated in connection with the passage of the Restoration Act.

1. Reviving the tradition

When New York’s Court of Appeals was faced thirty one years ago with a city seeking to disclaim responsibility for sex discrimination on the grounds that any discrimination acts were attributable only to an independent entity, the court would not hear of it:

Since the statute is to be “construed liberally for the accomplish­ment of the purposes thereof” (Executive Law, § 300), the City of Schenectady should not be permitted to avoid responsibility for discriminatory acts of persons appointed by it and under a procedure which it itself established, pursuant to the labor rela-

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120. Bar Association Letter, supra note 23, at 4. See also Brennan Center Statement, supra note 24, at 7 (“Rather than being reactive—waiting, for example, until after the Supreme Court cuts back on standing for testers and fair housing organizations, and then waiting further, for the years it frequently takes to achieve a specific legislative restoration—Intro 22 will provide a means of preventing such dismantling of New York City’s civil rights protections in the first place.”).
tions agreement. Sexual discrimination in employment being deplorable, *it is the duty of courts to make sure that the Human Rights Law works and that the intent of the Legislature is not thwarted by a combination of strict construction of the statute and a battle with semantics.*

Even the United States Supreme Court has—not so long ago—recognized the importance of looking to the purposes of a statute in determining how to construe it. It had to decide whether after-acquired evidence of serious wrongdoing (that is, that which would have resulted in dismissal) should operate in all cases to bar all relief for an earlier violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Before it could reach a conclusion, it needed to look at the purposes of the statutory scheme:

The ADEA and Title VII share common substantive features and also a common purpose: “the elimination of discrimination in the workplace.” . . . Congress designed the remedial measures in these statutes to serve as a “spur or catalyst” to cause employers “to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges” of discrimination. . . . Deterrence is one object of these statutes. Compensation for injuries caused by the prohibited discrimination is another.

Having identified compensation and deterrence as goals of the statute, the Court turned to the mechanism used by the statutes to effectuate the goals:

The ADEA, in keeping with these purposes, contains a vital element found in both Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act: It grants an injured employee a right of action to obtain the authorized relief. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c). The private litigant who seeks redress for his or her injuries vindicates both the deterrence and the compensation objectives of the ADEA. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45, 94 S. Ct. 1011, 1018, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974) (“[T]he private litigant [in Title VII] not only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the important congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices”); see also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1869, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977).

121. City of Schenectady v. State Div. on Human Rights, 335 N.E.2d 290, 295 (N.Y. 1975) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
123. Id. at 360.
124. Id. at 358 (internal citations omitted).
125. Id.
The Court concluded that a comprehensive ban on all relief in all cases would be contrary to the effective administration of the ADEA:

The objectives of the ADEA are furthered when even a single employee establishes that an employer has discriminated against him or her. The disclosure through litigation of incidents or practices that violate national policies respecting nondiscrimination in the work force is itself important, for the occurrence of violations may disclose patterns of noncompliance resulting from a misappreciation of the Act’s operation or entrenched resistance to its commands, either of which can be of industry-wide significance. The efficacy of its enforcement mechanisms becomes one measure of the success of the Act.126

One might disagree with the Court’s ultimate conclusion127 but, it is clear to see, the exploration of statutory purposes is essential.

2. Adapting to the enhanced enforcement focus of the City Human Rights Law

As has already been discussed, a court, seeking to construe a provision of the City Human Rights Law, must take account of: (a) the Council’s belief that the law has heretofore been construed too narrowly; (b) the fact that the purposes of the City Human Rights Law are “uniquely broad and remedial; and (c) the Council’s intention that the law be construed “in line with the purposes of fundamental amendments to the law enacted in 1991.”128

What the phrases “uniquely broad and remedial purposes” and “fundamental amendments” reflect is the fact that, in 1991, the City Human Rights Law shifted decisively away from the “let’s see if we can conciliate and become friends” philosophy that animated the first generation of modern civil rights statutes. The City Human Rights Law became instead a statute that had at its core traditional law enforcement values. These included the belief that deterrence was necessary to maximize compliance, and that deterrence could only be achieved: (a) under a regime that maximized responsibility for discriminatory acts and concurrently minimized

126. Id. at 358-59.
127. Some would argue, for example, that the Court did not adequately address what it acknowledged was the “not insubstantial” concern that “employers might as a routine matter undertake extensive discovery into an employee’s background or performance on the job to resist claims . . . .” Id. at 363. The view that Rule 11 sanctions would help to “deter most abuses” has proven to be unduly optimistic.
128. See Restoration Act, supra note 7, §§1, 7; 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 2.
the leeway accorded covered entities to evade such responsibility; and (b) where non-compliance was seen to have serious consequences.

Built into the law was the belief that a system that truly has “zero tolerance” for discrimination must punish violations severely, especially because every act of discrimination is seen to represent an injury not only to the individual victim, but to the City as a whole. Joined to this core belief in civil rights enforcement as law enforcement, and, in some respects, a function of it, was the view that the needs of victims of discrimination are sufficiently important that they trump—in all but the most limited circumstances—concerns about any burdens to be placed on covered entities.

Given the scant attention paid by courts to the changes effected by the 1991 Amendments, it may at first seem unlikely that the sea change described above actually occurred. Could it be that the 1991 Amendments merely distinguished its local law in a few requests from its state and federal counterparts? If so, one might reasonably infer that the changes actually meant that the City was fundamentally satisfied with (and had implicitly adopted) the basic principles, assumptions, and concerns of state and federal civil rights law.

In fact, any skepticism about the scope of the philosophical change represented by those amendments is quickly and simply put to rest by reading the 1991 Amendments. They were numerous, substantive, and dramatic. They included the creation of two new mechanisms for fighting discrimination: one, a private right of ac-

129. A rare exception where the existence of the legislative history was noticed was Burger v. Litton Industries, No. 91 Civ. 09181996 WL 421449, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 1996), adopted, No. 91 Civ. 09181996 WL 609421 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1996)) (“the ‘legislative history’ of the [New York City Human Rights Law] makes clear that it is to be even more liberally construed than the federal and state anti-discrimination laws”) (internal citation omitted). Referencing the language in Burger, the Second Circuit, in a case frequently cited for the proposition of parallelism, came tantalizingly close the following year to grappling with the 1991 Amendments before providing that it “need not consider those issues here, as [plaintiff] has not challenged the district court’s dismissal of her state and city human rights claims on appeal.” Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 629 n.1 (2d Cir. 1997); see also In re 119-121 East 97th Street Corp. v. N.Y.C. Comm’n on Human Rights, 642 N.Y.S.2d 638, 644 (App. Div. 1996) (“The legislative history of the amendments to the Administrative Code, including the civil penalty provision, indicates that they were intended to strengthen and expand the enforcement mechanisms of the law so the Commission could prevent discrimination from playing any role in actions related to employment, public accommodations, housing and other real estate.”).

tion for aggrieved persons; and two, vesting of the City’s Law Department with explicit statutory authority to investigate and prosecute instances of systemic discrimination. Recognizing that discrimination harmed the City itself, the 1991 Amendments imposed—for cases proven in the administrative context—civil penalties designed to “vindicate the public interest.”¹³¹

Rather than capping compensatory and punitive damages in the manner of Title VII out of concern for what uncapped awards might mean for covered entities, the City defined the private right of action as one that included uncapped compensatory and uncapped punitive damages.

Rather than excluding damages in disparate impact cases and in mixed motive cases, as the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did in connection with Title VII cases, the City Human Rights Law contains no such exclusion. The 1991 Amendments to the City law, however, did include as part of the fundamental policy of the law the idea that discrimination must “play no role.”¹³²

Disparate impact was explicitly covered in all contexts and in respect to all protected classes, with burdens of proof requiring more of a defendant than is the case pursuant to federal law.¹³³

Under federal law, a covered entity which has failed to provide reasonable accommodation as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act is nevertheless sheltered from exposure to damages if it had made good faith efforts to identify and make such accommodation.¹³⁴ The 1991 Amendments contained no such exemption.

Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act, only those impairments which substantially limit a major life function allow a person to meet either statute’s definition of disability.¹³⁵ The 1991 Amendments, by contrast, have no such restriction.

Under the Fair Housing Act, a covered entity is only required to permit a person to make reasonable modifications to a dwelling.¹³⁶

¹³¹ N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-126(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 174.
¹³² N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-101. This was echoed in Mayor David N. Dinkins’ remarks on June 18, 1991. See Mayor David N. Dinkins, Remarks, supra note 4, at 2.
¹³³ For example, even when a defendant has shown that a practice “bears a significant relationship to a significant business objective,” a plaintiff only has to produce “substantial evidence” that “an alternative policy or practice with less disparate impact is available. The defendant bears the burden of persuasion that the alternative policy or practice “would not serve the covered entity as well.” N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(17)(a).
¹³⁵ See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) and 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1), respectively.
Under the 1991 Amendments, the covered entity is both obliged to make and pay for such modifications, unless to do so would be an undue hardship.\textsuperscript{137}

The 1991 Amendments limited the then-existing exemption to the City Law’s fair housing provisions. Until the 1991 Amendments, rental apartments in owner-occupied two-family buildings were not covered by the law’s anti-discrimination provisions. The 1991 Amendments severely curtailed that exemption.\textsuperscript{138}

Not wanting to permit a covered entity to evade liability by claiming that it was unaware of the needs of persons with disabilities, the 1991 Amendments triggered the obligation to make reasonable accommodation to persons with disabilities as soon as the entity should have known of the disability, a provision not available under the Americans with Disabilities Act.\textsuperscript{139}

The minimum number of employees required for an employer to be covered under the City law had been four (meaning that hundreds of thousands of New York City workers not covered by Title VII were covered by the local law). The 1991 Amendments broadened coverage still further by requiring that natural persons not themselves employers who were independent contractors for an employer would be counted as employees for coverage purposes.\textsuperscript{140}

The 1991 Amendments adopted strict vicarious liability provisions, provisions unknown under Title VII. In the co-employee workplace harassment context, the City was not satisfied with imposing vicarious liability on the employer where it failed to take “immediate and appropriate corrective action” after one of its supervisors or managers learned of the discriminatory conduct.\textsuperscript{141}

Employers would also be vicariously liable where they should have known about the conduct, but failed to exercise reasonable dili-

\textsuperscript{137} See infra note 252 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{138} A comparison of the pre-1991 Amendments version of section 8-107(5)(a)(4)(a)(1) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, with its post-1991 Amendments counterpart, shows that the exemption is no longer available where the housing accommodation is “publicly-assisted,” as broadly defined in section 8-102(11), or where it has been publicly advertised, listed, or otherwise offered to the general public. See 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 156.


\textsuperscript{140} N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(5).

\textsuperscript{141} Id. § 8-107(13)(b)(2). It should be reemphasized that outside the contexts of section 8-107(1) (employment) and section 8-107(2) (apprentice training program) employers are strictly liable for the conduct of all employees or agents, regardless of position, not just for those employees or agents who exercise supervisory or managerial authority. Id. § 8-107(13)(a).
gence to prevent such conduct.\textsuperscript{142} For the first time, the City even identified circumstances under which employers would also be held responsible for conduct of independent contractors.\textsuperscript{143}

As Mayor Dinkins pointed out, a “fundamental step” of the 1991 amendments was making individuals responsible for their own discriminatory conduct.\textsuperscript{144}

Impatient with the litigation that had swirled around the definition of what entities would be considered a “place of public accommodation,” the 1991 Amendments adopted sweeping language covering places or providers of “goods, services, facilities, accommodations, advantage or privileges of any kind.”\textsuperscript{145} The message was this: a laundry list of covered types of establishments was not enough to encompass the City’s overarching goal of preventing discrimination whenever a covered entity interacted with a member of the public.\textsuperscript{146}

The changes in administrative procedure also represented a major shift. The City believed that discrimination cases had matured to a level well beyond the simple and relatively informal process that may have sufficed in the 1960s—a time when the routine brazenness of discrimination meant that cases were factually simple, a time when a sophisticated discrimination defense industry did not yet exist, and a time when the hope for voluntary compliance was still strong. The 1991 Amendments treated the administrative process as now deserving of the seriousness of a full-blown plenary proceeding, requiring timely answers, authorizing demands for record production and retention, placing the “prosecutorial bureau” of the Commission on Human Rights in the role of party to all administrative complaints, contemplating full pre-trial discovery and the ability to compel discovery, and providing that the Commission could impose civil penalties for the violation of its orders (in addition to enforcing its orders through court action).\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{142} Id. § 8-107(13)(b)(3). The “duty of care” standard under federal law, looking to whether appropriate preventative measures were taken, only applies in the context of supervisory or managerial misconduct.

\textsuperscript{143} Id. § 8-107(13)(c).

\textsuperscript{144} Mayor David N. Dinkins, Remarks, supra note 4, at 4-5.

\textsuperscript{145} N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9).

\textsuperscript{146} This description of amendments is only a partial one. Among others: elimination of a previously existing exemption for many educational institutions; the broadening of the proscription against retaliation to proscribe retaliation “in any manner”; and a new proscription against marital status discrimination in the employment context.

\textsuperscript{147} N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-111, 8-114, 8-117, 8-118, 8-125; 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 168-71, 174.
The 1991 Amendments were consistent in tone and approach: every change either expanded coverage, limited an exemption, increased responsibility, or broadened remedies. In case after case, the balance struck by the Amendments favored victims and the interests of enforcement over the claimed needs of covered entities in ways materially different from those incorporated into state and federal law. In view of this strong pattern, interpretations of “open” areas of law are only fairly construed consistent with the spirit that animated that pattern.

3. Acting in compliance with guidance specifically related to the Restoration Act

The guidance on how to carry out liberal construction in the manner intended by the Restoration Act is clear and consistent. The Anti-Discrimination Center’s testimony referenced the principles described in the preceding section, including the need to maximize coverage and counteract evasion.\textsuperscript{148} The Brennan Center, identifying the “stronger law enforcement focus provided by the local law,” explained that the task was to construe the law bearing these purposes in mind.\textsuperscript{149} The Bar Association pointed to the City Council’s “clear intent to provide the greatest possible protection for civil rights.”\textsuperscript{150}

The 2005 Committee Report echoes these concerns when discussing how judges should approach issues of interpretation arising under the construction provision of City Human Rights Law. The Report says that decision makers should be guided by certain principles. The first principle specified is that “discrimination should not play a role in decisions made by employers, landlords, and providers of public accommodations”; the second is that “traditional methods and principles of law enforcement ought to be ap-

\textsuperscript{148}. See Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 5 (citing the need to: “(a) maximize the coverage provided by the law; (b) make certain that discrimination plays no role in the various decisions made each day in New York City by employers, landlords, and providers of public accommodations; (c) strictly limit the zone in which discrimination may be practiced; (d) maximize the deterrent effect of the law, with the recognition that traditional methods and principles of law enforcement should be applicable in the civil rights context; (e) minimize and counteract evasion of the law, including attempts to feign ignorance of the requirements of the law, or otherwise to engage in diversionary legal tactics; (f) always compensate victims of discrimination fully; (g) maximize access to the courts; and (h) treat discrimination injuries as serious injuries both to the individual victim, and to New York City.”).

\textsuperscript{149}. Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at. 4.

\textsuperscript{150}. Bar Association Letter, supra note 23, at 4.
plied in the civil rights context”; and the third is that “victims of discrimination suffer serious injuries for which they ought to receive full compensation.”\textsuperscript{151} The Report concludes with an explanation of the importance of the civil penalties being enhanced by the Restoration Act, an explanation encapsulating the Council’s “zero tolerance” policy: the imposition of penalties, according to the Report, “sends a strong signal to those who discriminate that such acts cause serious injury, to both the persons directly involved and the social fabric of the city as a whole, which will not be tolerated.”\textsuperscript{152}

One cannot review the Council’s recitation that the City Human Rights Law had been construed too narrowly, the Council’s characterization of the law’s purposes as being “uniquely broad and remedial,” the Council’s goal of vindicating the purposes of the 1991 Amendments, the relentless broadening of those amendments, the testimony on which the Council relied, and the other aspects of the Restoration Act’s legislative history, without emerging with the clear sense that any doubts about the interpretation of the law should be resolved in favor of giving the law the broadest and most powerful reach that is possible. Consistent with this approach, any exemptions to the law’s coverage must be construed narrowly.\textsuperscript{153} Application of these considerations to more than a dozen illustrations of areas of the law is covered in Section F of this article. First though, it is important to set out explicitly the Restoration Act’s respect for—and consistency with—principles of judicial independence.

E. Maintaining Judicial Independence

The legislative history makes clear that the Restoration Act is not in any way designed to place judges in a straitjacket, but rather, is designed to combat the mischief of rote parallelism, and

\textsuperscript{151} 2005 Committee Report, supra note 22, at 5. The Report also insists that there must always be “thoughtful, independent consideration of whether the proposed interpretation would fulfill the uniquely broad and remedial purposes of the City’s human rights law.” Id. at 5, n.8.

\textsuperscript{152} Id. at 6.

\textsuperscript{153} See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 526, 531-32 (1995) (“[W]e are mindful of the [Fair Housing Act’s] stated policy ‘to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing within the United States. We also note precedent recognizing the FHA’s ‘broad and inclusive’ compass, and therefore according a ‘generous construction’ to the Act’s complaint-filing provision. Accordingly, we regard this case as an instance in which an exception to ‘a general statement of policy’ is sensibly read ‘narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the [policy.]’”) (internal citations omitted).
to remind, empower, and require judges to fulfill their essential role as active and zealous agents for the vindication of the purposes of the law. The expectations of and for the Restoration Act were expressed consistently. The Bar Association pointed out, for example, that the Act “does not preclude judges from adopting the prevailing interpretation of federal law . . . so long as they conclude that the federal interpretation best serves the broad remedial purposes of the Human Rights Law.”154 The key is taking the time to engage in the process of asking “which interpretation of the law will best fulfill the objectives of the law.”155

The Brennan Center observed that “[i]t is a fundamental task of a court to use its best judgment to determine [which interpretation] best fulfills the purpose of the statute under examination. The provision of Intro 22 in question requires a court to do nothing more than engage in that process with due regard for the underlying purposes of the law.”156

The Anti-Discrimination Center’s testimony made this same point: “The bill does not oblige a judge to accept a particular argument that an advocate is advancing, but it does insist that judges thoughtfully consider whether the interpretation being advanced, or a different one, would address the purposes of the City Human Rights Law most robustly.”157 In language almost identical to that testimony, the 2005 Committee Report noted that, “The bill does not require a decision maker to accept any particular argument being advanced by an advocate, but underscores the need for thoughtful, independent consideration of whether the proposed interpretation would fulfill the uniquely broad and remedial purposes of the City’s Human Rights Law.”158

In an era where the phrase “judicial restraint” is frequently used more as a term of approbation than one that has reliable meaning, it is important to decode the ways in which the Restoration Act expects and does not expect judges to exercise restraint. Restraint is expected both in resisting the urge towards rote parallelism, and in respect to not substituting a judge’s own, more conservative set of social policy decisions for the policy judgments made by the Council. On the other hand, activism is expected in seeing that the

155. Id.
158. 2005 Committee Report, supra note 22, at 5 n.8.
law as interpreted fulfills its extraordinarily broad intended reach.\textsuperscript{159}

When construing a statute that is effectively “new territory” because of the absence of serious work to construe it heretofore; that announces that “there is no greater danger to the health, morals, safety and welfare of the city” than discrimination;\textsuperscript{160} that describes discrimination as “menac[ing] the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state”;\textsuperscript{161} and that insists that discrimination be proscribed “from playing any role in actions relating to employment, public accommodations, and housing,”\textsuperscript{162} it is well to consider what a Supreme Court—very different in composition from today’s Court—did in the early days after the enactment of the Fair Housing Act. In surveying what was then also new territory, citing the fact that the language of the Fair Housing Act was “broad and inclusive”\textsuperscript{163} and was intended to vindicate “a policy that Congress considered to be of the highest priority,”\textsuperscript{164} that Court concluded that “only a generous construction” of its provisions would give vitality to those provisions and carry out the purposes of the statute.\textsuperscript{165} In passing the Restoration Act, the Council was depending on the judiciary to play a comparable role today.

\textbf{F. Illustrations of the Intended Construction Principles}

As the City Human Rights Law is hereafter used, there will emerge numerous areas for interpretation beyond those brought to the Council’s attention. This fact should not operate to suggest any limitation of the liberal construction principles that are the focus of this article.\textsuperscript{166} Nevertheless, there were quite a few areas of con-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{159}See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{160}N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-101.
\item \textsuperscript{161}Id.
\item \textsuperscript{162}Id.
\item \textsuperscript{163}Traficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
\item \textsuperscript{164}Id. at 211.
\item \textsuperscript{165}Id. at 212.
\item \textsuperscript{166}Cf. Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir 1972). In that case, the D.C. Circuit, empanelled en banc, treated a question not specifically addressed in the Fair Housing Act: did the Act cover a Recorder of Deeds who had been accepting and filing racially restrictive covenants? The lead concurrence began by acknowledging that “there is nothing in the legislative history tending either to support or to refute the inference arising from the language that the Act prohibits statements of racial preference emanating from the Recorder’s office,” and by noting that, “[i]n all likelihood, few congressmen even addressed their thinking to this particular problem.” Id. at 634. That acknowledgment, however, did not operate as evidence that coverage should not lie: “no court has ever held that Congress must specifically indicate how a statute should be applied in every case before the judiciary can go about the business
\end{itemize}
cern that did animate the Restoration Act, and an examination of those is instructive, both for the particular resolution intended, and for their illustrative value.

1. First order of business

Four cases were consistently identified by name as inconsistent with statutory language and purposes: McGrath, Levin, Forrest, and Priore. Council Member Palma’s statement regarding the intent and consequences of the bill stated flatly: “With Intro 22, these cases, and others like them, will no longer hinder vindication of our civil rights.”167 The areas of law to which these cases (erroneously) spoke are treated first.

i. McGrath: Attorney’s fees in “nominal damages” cases

In rejecting McGrath’s importation of Farrar and making clear that attorney’s fees are available in cases that result in only nominal damages, courts will (1) avoid importing a restriction not mentioned by the language of the City Human Rights Law and not contemplated by the 1991 Amendments, (2) further the ability of victims of discrimination to secure counsel, and (3) thereby vindicate the statute’s intent to see that no instance of discrimination is allowed to stand unchallenged. The phrase “victim of discrimination” is deliberate: the only people being denied fees under the McGrath/Farrar rule are those who have proved to a jury’s satisfaction that the defendant did engage in an unlawful discriminatory practice.168

of applying it.” Id. at 634. The opinion pointed to a then-recent Supreme Court decision which had recognized that:

[M]ost Congressional discussion of the public accommodations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had focused on places of spectator entertainment, not recreational areas.” Nonetheless, the Supreme Court had held the Act applicable to a lake club with boating and dancing facilities, remarking that the Act’s coverage should not be “restricted to the primary objects of Congress’ concern” since the purpose of the law was “to remove the daily affront and humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of access to facilities ostensibly open to the general public.

Id. at 634–35. The Ridley Court, too, was unwilling to restrict the reach of the Fair Housing Act to “the primary objects of Congress’ concern.” Id. at 634.

167. Each of these four cases was also cited as an example of improper judicial construction. See Bar Association Letter, supra note 23, at 1 n.1; Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at 3 n.4, 5 n.6, and 6 n.8; Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 2 nn.1-4.

168. It is true that the most harsh effects of Farrar can theoretically be avoided in federal court if the plaintiff seeks and is granted equitable relief, although in McGrath, such relief was not sought. Leaving aside the infrequency with which such relief is granted in an individual case where only nominal money damages are
ii. Levin: Marital status

Consider the following exchange between a landlord and a couple to whom he has shown an available apartment:

*Landlord:* Did you like it?
*Couple:* We did. We’d like to rent it.
*Landlord:* Are you married?
*Couple:* No.
*Landlord:* Well, because you are not married, I will not rent the apartment to you.
*Couple:* Is there any other reason?
*Landlord:* No.

One might think that this is a straightforward single-motive, intentional discrimination case. The City Human Rights Law has long prohibited housing discrimination on the basis of marital status.\(^{169}\) As early as 1977, the City Human Rights Commission considered the argument of a landlord who “believed that unmarried persons planning to live together would be more likely to have financial difficulties culminating in the breaking of their lease than would married persons living together.”\(^{170}\) The Commission rejected the argument:

> It was subjective decisions of this very type, so clearly mired on preconceived stereotypical attitudes, which served to make finding housing so great a problem for unmarried people, and which was in large part responsible for the legislative enactment under which this Commission’s jurisdiction has been involved in this case.\(^{171}\)

New York’s highest court, however, has seen things differently. In rulings most recently affirmed in *Levin v. Yeshiva University*, the Court of Appeals has held that protection against being intentionally discriminated against on the basis of marital status only applies to an individual who has been discriminated against, not to persons who have been discriminated against because of a “disqualifying relationship.”\(^{172}\) In the court’s conception, “marital status” corresponds only to the box an individual would check off on a form.

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\(^{169}\) N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(5)(a)(1). The provision was added in 1973.


\(^{171}\) Id. at *7.

\(^{172}\) Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 754 N.E.2d 1099, 1102 (N.Y. 2001)). As was pointed out in Center testimony, the case did not purport to analyze the right of an unmarried
The court did not consider the fact that the City Human Rights Law provision in question states that a housing provider is forbidden to withhold or deny housing “from any person or group of persons” based on the protected class status (including marital status) of “such person or persons,” and did not consider that the common understanding of “marital status” encompasses the status of a couple. In the illustrative conversation cited above, for example, it would be the very unusual landlord who would have been satisfied with the answer “Yes, each of us is a ‘married person,’” if the two people were having an affair (and were only married persons in the sense of being married to others). In the real world, the landlord was asking, “Are you married to one another?”

Not surprisingly, the Court did not—either in Levin or in the predecessor cases—consider what interpretation of marital status would best fulfill the purposes of the statute, nor did it consider the City Human Rights Law independently of its consideration of the State Human Rights Law. A rule that only prohibits a landlord from excluding all unmarried persons (regardless of whether they are living alone or together) leaves a great deal of room for the kind of stereotypical assumptions about marital status to play a role in decisions relating to housing, the very assumptions that had long ago been condemned by the Commission on Human Rights.

The Council specifically contemplated that Levin could not stand in the face of the expanded and revived liberal construction provision, and anticipated that courts would be obliged to strike it down. In the meantime, the Council added protection for registered domestic partners, but that protection is only an “interim mea-

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174. Cf. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm’n., 12 Cal. 4th 1143, 1155 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (“To determine what a statute means, we first consult the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. ‘The usual and ordinary meaning of the words ‘marital status,’ as applied to two prospective tenants is that a landlord may not ask them whether they are married or refuse to rent to them because they are, or are not.’”) (internal citation and footnote omitted).
175. In the course of more than two years of work on what became the Restoration Act, and conversations with literally hundreds of people, the task of explaining the Court’s conception of marital status was more difficult than anything else. Each and every person found the Court’s cramped interpretation of marital status either entirely counterintuitive or incomprehensible, or both.
176. See infra notes 311-13 and accompanying text.
As the 2005 Committee Report put it, the domestic partnership protection was being enacted “[p]ending judicial reconsideration of the proper scope of protection from discrimination based on marital status . . . .”

The decision to create an interim solution arose from objections that had been raised by the Bloomberg Administration to the language in the original version of the bill. That language had defined marital status to include the status of a person “in relation to another person,” without any qualification whatsoever as to the nature of the relationship between the two people involved. The Bloomberg Administration repeatedly denounced the proposed provision as unintentionally extending protections far beyond the Council’s desire to stop discrimination against unmarried couples. The Council’s solution, as noted above, was to have the courts draw the parameters of “couples” protection as part of the judiciary’s liberal construction function.

The task is one that the courts should readily be able to handle. In Braschi v. Stahl Co., for example, New York’s Court of Appeals

177. Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 7 (pointing out that “the broader question will have to be revisited after the courts have re-examined their previous marital status rulings in light of each and all of the requirements of revised Section 8-130”).
179. See Intro 439 of 2003 (the predecessor bill to Intro 22), NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS 1518 (2003) and the original version of Intro 22, NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS 338 (2004).
180. The Commission on Human Rights first claimed that the language “extends the law to protect based upon personality traits, individual qualities and characteristics.” Comm’r Patricia Gatling, New York City Commission on Human Rights, Statement at Hearing of New York City Council Committee on General Welfare 2 (Oct. 16, 2003) (on file with Committee on General Welfare). A year later, the Commission still thought the language was too broad:
I’m still not clear on what the class of people are. I’ll give you an example:
Before I got married, I had a roommate for 12 years. We lived in an apartment together. We shared household expenses. We even had a summer house that we rented together with a group of other people. That I assume would not be the type of relationship you’re looking to protect. Yet the way this is written or the way I understand the proposal as the definition of marital status. I would think that’s inappropriate.
Clifford Mulqueen, General Counsel, New York City Commission on Human Rights, Testimony at Hearing of New York City Council Committee on General Welfare 73-74 (Sept. 22, 2004) (transcript on file with the New York City Clerk’s Office).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 172-74. While the Council did step back from its initial language protecting even two people with the most tenuous ties between them, there is, of course, no evidence that the Council was seeking to narrow the scope that the existing marital status provision would have given to unmarried couples had the Levin court paid heed to the intentions of the framers of the 1991 Amendments, nor any evidence that the Council wanted to exempt marital status from the enhanced liberal construction requirements of the Restoration Act.
was faced with the problem of how to define “family” for the purpose of determining who has survivor protection from eviction pursuant to the rent control laws.\textsuperscript{182} In that case, the Court of Appeals recognized that statutes are to be interpreted “so as to avoid objectionable consequences and to prevent hardship or injustice,” and that, “where doubt exists as to the meaning of a term, and a choice between two constructions is afforded, the consequences that may result from the different interpretations should be considered.”\textsuperscript{183} The court went on to point out that, “since rent-control laws are remedial in nature and designed to promote the public good, their provisions should be interpreted broadly to effectuate their purposes.”\textsuperscript{184}

The court concluded that the term “family” should not be rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized their relationship by obtaining, for instance, a marriage certificate or an adoption order. The intended protection against sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead should find its foundation in the reality of family life. In the context of eviction, a more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence. This view comports both with our society’s traditional concept of “family” and with the expectations of individuals who live in such nuclear units.\textsuperscript{185}

After the court had acted, the holding was codified in regulation, and affords protection where there is a showing of “emotional and financial commitment, and interdependence” between the two people involved.\textsuperscript{186} In the context of marital status protection for couples, the same principles referenced in Braschi demand, at minimum, that couples who hold themselves out as “partners” (that is, two people with an emotional and financial commitment to, and interdependence between, each other) be protected as couples against discrimination.\textsuperscript{187}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{183} Id. at 52.
\textsuperscript{184} Id. (internal citations omitted).
\textsuperscript{185} Id. at 53–54 (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{186} New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2204.6(d) (1993).
\textsuperscript{187} Independent of what comes to be done in terms of protecting couples as couples, it bears repetition that Levin did not foreclose claims by an unmarried individual that he or she was being discriminated against in terms and conditions either intentionally or as a matter of disparate impact.
\end{flushleft}
iii. Forrest: Vicarious liability

As discussed above in part I.B.3, and as described to the Council, Forrest disregarded the distinct language and legislative history of the 1991 Amendments which had established strict employer liability for the acts of employees who exercised supervisory or managerial responsibility. The case also disregarded the fact that the affirmative defense available under the City Human Rights Law was narrower than that available under the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense the Supreme Court later created in 1998. The City Law, after all, treated an employer’s “reasonable steps to prevent” as only being relevant to liability in non-supervisory, non-managerial harassment situations. Neither Forrest’s importation of a state vicarious liability standard contrary to the express language of the City Law, nor the case’s importation of a federal affirmative defense inconsistent with the City Law, can have continuing vitality.

iv. Priore: Individual liability

As pointed out to the Council, this, too, is an area where a court simply refused to apply the language of the law. Most other courts had previously recognized that the Council, having proscribed in 1991 discrimination not only by an employer, but by “an employee or agent thereof,” meant that discrimination by employees or agents of employers was also to be prohibited. If the First Department had thought that the Council had not really meant to move beyond the proscriptions of State law, the Restoration Act makes that belief impossible to sustain, and Priore must be abandoned.

2. Key challenges

i. Abandoning the “severe or pervasive” requirement in harassment cases

An employer has two high-paid employees in a particular department, one man and one woman. The employer tells the wo...

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188. See Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at 6.
189. This belief had no basis in fact. See infra notes 75–90 and accompanying text.
190. The illustrations that follow are not designed to suggest that other issues brought to the Council’s attention are not important for courts to examine. For example, the scope of what constitutes “adverse action” needs to be reexamined. A restrictive interpretation both undermines enforcement of the statute, and is inconsistent with the concerns that animated the Council’s elimination of the materiality requirement in retaliation cases. The parameters of the “continuing violation” doctrine need to be explored anew, especially since, as of the 1991 Amendments—and, indeed, until the Supreme Court’s decision in National Rail Road
man that, because of her gender, she will henceforth be paid ten cents less per hour than her male counterpart. Though the gross economic loss (assuming a fifty hour week) is only five dollars per week (less, after taxes), the woman would be able to tell her employer with confidence that the employer’s action is prohibited pursuant to Title VII. “I am entitled,” she says, “not to be discriminated against in the terms and conditions of my employment.” The fact that her out-of-pocket damages are small does not undercut the fact that a gender-based distinction in terms and conditions has been effected. In other words, liability is one issue and damages another.

When it comes to harassment claims, however, the courts conflate the issues of liability and damages. As most recently summarized by the Supreme Court in *Clark County School District v. Breeden*, “sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII only if it is so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.”\(^{191}\) The Court went on to underline the fact that a “recurring point in [our] opinions is that simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’”\(^{192}\)

The “severe or pervasive” rule invited lower courts to “discriminate against one term or condition of employment by assigning a significantly lower importance to the right to work in an atmosphere free from discrimination.”\(^{193}\) As a result, there is a wide range of conduct—all of it treating one person less well than another because of gender—which courts tolerate.

In a recent case in New York,\(^{194}\) for example, a plaintiff had alleged that, in the course of a five month period, the defendant’s vice-president (who was also head of the sales department): had repeatedly told her—in the presence of other employees—that she was “sleeping with the wrong employee”;\(^{195}\) had photographed

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\(^{192}\) *Id.* at 271.


\(^{195}\) The vice-president apparently knew that plaintiff was “romantically involved” with a co-employee. *Id.* at *1.
himself at a party “placing his hand on [plaintiff’s] upper thigh and pulling her skirt up two or three inches”; had twice said in the presence of other employees that he should accompany plaintiff on vacation (instead of her boyfriend); had, on about half-a-dozen occasions, approached plaintiff from behind while she was working and “placed his hands on her back, neck or shoulders and leaned into her”; had at least one conversation with plaintiff about how “hot” she was and “the type of underwear she wore”; and, after a partition was, at plaintiff’s request, installed around her desk to protect her from the vice-president, who would “leer” at plaintiff as he went by her workspace.  

The judge, citing the fact that the conduct occurred “intermittently” over a five or six-month period, concluded that it was “not particularly ‘frequent’ under the Title VII standard.”  

Characterizing the conduct to which plaintiff alleged she was subjected as “occasional touching, rude comments, and hostile stares,” the judge concluded that this conduct “cannot be said to amount to more than ‘relatively innocuous incidences of overbearing or provocative behavior.’ As such, they do not reach the requisite level of employment-altering severity.”  

As detailed in License to Harass, trivialization of harassment as seen in Schiano is a frequent occurrence, and there are a variety of techniques used to insulate employers from liability for conduct that treats women poorly merely because they are women. These include requiring that the conduct be severe and pervasive (instead of severe or pervasive), and include the phenomenon of courts “tolerating conduct that would be considered sexual assault or attempted sexual assault under the criminal law” and requiring “proof that the conduct tangibly affected the plaintiff’s job performance.” Other techniques include parsing evidence to avoid a finding of severe or pervasive; and rejecting “evidence of harassment that occurred before the employer took some remedial action even though it does not stop the harassment.”  

While the Supreme Court sees the “severe or pervasive” standard as important to preventing “Title VII from expanding into a
general civility code,"\textsuperscript{203} the focus of the City Human Rights Law in light of the 1991 Amendments and the Restoration Act is different. Its focus is instead making certain that discrimination not play any role in the workplace or elsewhere.

In fact, at the time the 1991 Amendments were being considered and enacted, the City Commission on Human Rights had questioned the prevailing federal standard. In 1989, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Commission had made a post-hearing recommendation that the Commission dismiss a case that had revolved around one alleged incident of harassment, and the Commission affirmed the view of its Law Enforcement Bureau that the ALJ had “applied the wrong standard” for determining liability in a sexual harassment case, stating: “The Bureau correctly notes that the Commission is not bound by federal civil rights law. The New York City Human Rights Law is a separate and independent statute. Indeed, in many instances the City’s law provides victims of discrimination with broader protection than that provided by federal law.”\textsuperscript{204} The Commission remanded the case to the ALJ for further consideration of the “proper standard.”\textsuperscript{205}

On remand, the ALJ explained that he agreed that, if proven, “[a] single act of harassment . . . would be sufficient to constitute sexual harassment,” but because his decision was based on a determination that the complainant was not credible, he again recommended that the case be dismissed.\textsuperscript{206} When the Commission reviewed the recommendation in April of 1990, the Commission rejected it, citing “complex and important credibility issues,” and decided to constitute a panel of three Commissioners to “consider and suggest guidelines for hearing and deciding sexual harassment cases.”\textsuperscript{207}

No further action was taken prior to the 1991 Amendments, and, thus at the time of their enactment, there was an open question to

\textsuperscript{205} Id. at 2-3.
\textsuperscript{206} It was alleged that a proprietor of the defendant had put his hand up the complainant’s skirt. Murphy v. John Foleros King Pub, No. 03124079-EP, slip op. at 2 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts., Mar. 6, 1990) (recommended decision and order on remand) (on file with the library of New York City’s Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH)).
\textsuperscript{207} Murphy v. John Foleros King Pub, No. 03124079-EP, slip op. at 3-4 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts., Apr. 25, 1990) (en banc) (decision and order) (on file with the library of New York City’s Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH)).
be considered by the Commission as to what standard to apply in light of the fact that the City Human Rights Law is a “separate and independent statute.” Sadly, this matter was not ultimately considered— in 1994, early in the Giuliani Administration, the Commission decided that a further hearing was not necessary. It did so simply as a matter of agreeing that the complainant had not presented sufficient credible evidence, not as an analysis of the legal standard.  

The need to address this issue was argued to the Council during the consideration of the Restoration Act by multiple parties in connection with the need for enhanced liberal construction language. A simple solution (one that neither turns the City Human Rights Law into a general civility code nor a shield for discriminators) would adopt a standard which attaches liability whenever the covered entity is shown to have treated the plaintiff less favorably than others because of a protected status— regardless of the level of pervasiveness or severity of the discriminatory harassment—unless a covered entity demonstrated as an affirmative defense that the discriminatory harassment complained of consisted of no more than what a reasonable victim of discrimination would consider petty slights and trivial annoyances.

The elimination of the “severe or pervasive” requirement, coupled with the addition of a burden shift, would tackle the real issue: too many judges are unwilling to allow juries to evaluate contested issues in the sexual harassment context, preferring to arrogate the fact-determining role unto themselves (via the improper granting of motions for summary judgment). If a defendant had the burden of persuasion that the conduct complained of consisted of “no more than petty slights and trivial annoyances,” summary judg-

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209. See Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at 5 (complaining that “without any consideration of what standard would best further the purposes of the City Law, women who have been sexually harassed are routinely thrown out of court without getting a chance to have a jury hear their claims because a judge uses the federal standard that they have not been harassed enough”); Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 2 (“We have long had the problem of judges insisting that harassment [has] to be ‘severe or pervasive’ before it is actionable, even though such a requirement unduly narrows the reach of the law.”); Kathryn Lake Mazierski, President, New York State National Organization for Women, Testimony at Hearing of the New York City Council’s Comm’n on Gen. Welfare 50 (Sept. 22, 2004) (transcript on file with New York City Clerk’s Office) (noting that the federal standard “continually hurts women”).
ment would be improvidently granted far less frequently than it is now. As the Second Circuit has recently reaffirmed:

A party faces a significantly heightened standard to obtain judgment as a matter of law on an issue as to which that party bears the burden of proof. “It is rare that the party having the burden of proof on an issue at trial is entitled to a directed verdict.” Granite Computer Leasing Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 894 F.2d 547, 551 (2d Cir.1990). Indeed, “[a] verdict should be directed in such instances only if the evidence in favor of the movant is so overwhelming that the jury could rationally reach no other result.” Id. See also Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 109 (2d Cir. 2001); 9 Moore’s Federal Practice § 50.05 (2004) (“[G]ranting judgment as a matter of law for a party who bears the burden of proof is an extreme step that may be taken only when the evidence favoring the movant is so one-sided that, absent adequate evidentiary response by the nonmovant, it could not be disbelieved by a reasonable jury.”). 210

This result will not please all stakeholders, but its appropriateness is measured, as with other areas of the law, by how competing values are to be properly weighed. For some judges, for example, the most pressing concern may be that, if summary judgment motions are not readily granted, “we are allowing disgruntled employees to impose the costs of trial on employers who, although they have not acted with the intent to discriminate, may have treated their employees unfairly.” 211 A very different value system acknowledges that “the hostile judicial climate in relation to [sexual harassment] claims means that many victims of sexual harassment never step forward. Many of [those] who do are usually informed by attorneys that the way the law stands now, their claims will not be taken seriously.” 212

The pattern of the City Human Rights Law—its preferred method of balancing or weighing values—is to focus its concern on removing the inhibitions that prevent victims from coming forward, and to accept the cost of trial for covered entities as a necessary price of doing everything possible to eliminate all forms of discrimination. And in this particular area, as the Second Circuit has noted, it is especially important that juries get to play their role:

212. Mazierski, supra note 209, at 48-49.
Today, while gender relations in the workplace are rapidly evolving, and views of what is appropriate behavior are diverse and shifting, a jury made up of a cross-section of our heterogeneous communities provides the appropriate institution for deciding whether borderline situations should be characterized as sexual harassment and retaliation.

The factual issues in this case cannot be effectively settled by a decision of an Article III judge on summary judgment. Whatever the early life of a federal judge, she or he usually lives in a narrow segment of the enormously broad American socioeconomic spectrum, generally lacking the current real-life experience required in interpreting subtle sexual dynamics of the workplace based on nuances, subtle perceptions, and implicit communications.213

Disaggregating liability and damages in the manner suggested will still allow covered entities the tools needed to defend themselves against truly trivial charges and against damages out of proportion to the harm suffered, but will make an important contribution to the fight to eliminate gender-based discrimination—regardless of whether that discrimination manifests itself in pay disparities, promotional disparities, or harassment.

ii. No artificial limits on reasonable accommodation

The Second Circuit, in a 2-1 decision constituting a significant blow against the rights of people with disabilities, ruled in 1998 that it is “fundamental” that the Fair Housing Act “addresses the accommodation of handicaps, not the alleviation of economic disadvantages that may be correlated with having handicaps.”214 The case involved plaintiffs who alleged that they were unable to work because they were disabled, and thus needed the assistance of the federal Section 8 program. The accommodation requested was a waiver of the landlord’s policy against allowing Section 8 tenants.

The Second Circuit majority thought this sort of accommodation was not contemplated by the Fair Housing Act: “What stands between these plaintiffs and the apartments [at issue] is a shortage of money, and nothing else.”215 For the majority, the Fair Housing Act did not “elevate the rights of the handicapped poor over the rights of the non-handicapped poor. Economic discrimination . . . is not cognizable as a failure to make reasonable accommodations

215. Id. at 302.
The majority contrasted what it considered an accommodation appropriately linked to a disability: when a seeing-eye dog is permitted despite a “no pets” policy, wrote the majority, that accommodation responds directly to a disability.\footnote{216}{\textit{Id.}}

\textit{Salute} was decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{U.S. Airways v. Barnett}, a case arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act.\footnote{217}{\textit{Id.} at 301-02.} That case held that a person with a disability similarly situated to a person without a disability may have preference (an accommodation) if the accommodation responds to the need created by the disability, even if the policy in question poses barriers to the non-disabled person as well. As the Supreme Court pointed out: “Were that not so, the ‘reasonable accommodation’ provision could not accomplish its intended objective . . . [m]any employers will have neutral rules governing the kinds of actions most needed to reasonably accommodate a worker with a disability.”\footnote{218}{\textit{Id.} at 301-02.} The case also rejected Justice Scalia’s reasoning that a policy that burdens the disabled and non-disabled alike is therefore not a disability-related obstacle.\footnote{219}{\textit{Id.} at 301-02.}

In view of \textit{Barnett}, it seems unlikely that \textit{Salute} could survive as a matter of Fair Housing Act jurisprudence. Indeed, a post-\textit{Barnett} case, \textit{Giebeler v. M&B Associates},\footnote{220}{\textit{Id.} at 301-02.} dealt with the case of a man who did not have earned income because his disability rendered him unable to work. The man sought to have his mother, a financially responsible person, be a co-signer on the lease, and wanted to have the landlord’s “no co-signer” policy waived. Permitting the co-signing would have caused the landlord no financial harm; on the contrary, the proposed co-signer met the landlord’s financial qualifications. Nevertheless, the landlord refused. The Ninth Circuit found that the waiver of the policy represented, first of all, a type of accommodation contemplated by the Fair Housing Act, and, as applied to the facts of the case, was a reasonable accommodation.\footnote{221}{\textit{Id.} at 301-02.}

\footnote{216}{\textit{Id.}}
\footnote{217}{\textit{Id.} at 301-02.}
\footnote{218}{\textit{U.S. Airways v. Barnett}, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). Though \textit{Barnett} was an Americans with Disabilities Act case, courts interpreting the disability rights provisions of the Fair Housing Act frequently analogize to the ADA. \textit{See}, e.g., \textit{Tsombidh v. West Haven Fire Dep’t}, 352 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 2003).}
\footnote{219}{\textit{Barnett}, 535 U.S. at 398.}
\footnote{220}{\textit{See id.} at 413.}
\footnote{221}{343 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2003).}
\footnote{222}{\textit{Id.} at 1145.}
Giebeler adopted the reasoning of the dissent in Salute, which had pointed out that, in the seeing-eye dog and other examples cited by the Second Circuit majority:

[I]t is not the handicap itself that is directly accommodated by the change in a policy. Rather, it is the need that was created by the particular handicap that is accommodated. Thus, a person’s blindness creates the need for a seeing-eye dog, and a person’s multiple sclerosis leads to impaired mobility, which, in turn, creates the need for a priority parking space close to the tenant’s residence.223

Having identified the request for a waiver of the “no-cosigner” policy as an “accommodation,” the Ninth Circuit found that: (1) the plaintiff had demonstrated that the proposed accommodation was reasonable on its face; and that (2) the defendant had failed to meet its burden of showing that, in the particular circumstances, agreeing to the request would have caused it undue hardship.224

Whatever the ultimate result under the Fair Housing Act, the type of accommodation sought in the Giebeler case would certainly be covered under the City Human Rights Law. In contrast to the ADA, the threshold coverage provisions of which the Supreme Court has felt the need to interpret “strictly” to make certain that no more people are covered than Congress intended,225 the City Human Rights Law has no such concerns. Not only does the Restoration Act’s overall focus on the broadest possible coverage preclude judicial carving out of a category of accommodation, the disability provisions themselves offer specific additional evidence of the desire to go even further than the Fair Housing Act or the ADA.

For example, one has a “disability” for purposes of City Human Rights Law regardless of whether one’s impairment substantially limits one in a major life activity or not.226 Housing providers have qualitatively more extensive obligations regarding modifications to premises than are required under the Fair Housing Act.227 The obligation to make accommodation arises not only where a covered

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223. Salute, 136 F.3d at 308 (Calebresi, J., dissenting), cited with approval in Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1153.
224. Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1140-42.
225. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197-98 (2002) (stating its conclusion that the terms “need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled is confirmed by the first section of the ADA, which lays out the legislative findings and purposes that motivate the Act”).
227. See discussion infra notes 252–56 and accompanying text.
entity actually knows of a disability, but also where the covered entity should know of a disability.\textsuperscript{228}

Most importantly, the accommodation language itself is framed extremely broadly. The requirement is to make reasonable accommodation to the “needs” of persons with disabilities (not to “disabilities” directly).\textsuperscript{229} The law also sets out a different analysis than pertains under federal law.

A plaintiff does have to identify an accommodation that would enable him to overcome a disability-generated need “to enjoy the right or rights in question,”\textsuperscript{230} but “reasonable accommodation” is defined as “such accommodation that can be made that shall not cause undue hardship in the conduct of the covered entity’s business.”\textsuperscript{231} Every accommodation, therefore, that “can be made” is reasonable except for those a covered entity proves would pose an “undue hardship.”\textsuperscript{232} The category of accommodations under federal law that are “unreasonable” though they do not cause “undue hardship,”\textsuperscript{233} simply does not exist under the City Law. Finally, the City Law places the burden of persuasion on a covered entity on the question of whether the person with a disability could, with the proposed accommodation, enjoy the rights in question.\textsuperscript{234}

Because a waiver of a “no co-signer” or “no guarantor” rule of the sort at issue in Giebeler could enable a person unable to work because of a disability to rent or buy an apartment, such an accommodation is required by the City Human Rights Law unless the covered entity could prove that, in the particular circumstance, the waiver would cause an undue hardship.

The issues raised by the conflicting cases of Salute and Giebeler were much on the minds of those seeking the independent construction sought to be guaranteed by the Restoration Act.\textsuperscript{235} Simi-

\textsuperscript{232} The burden of persuasion of demonstrating undue hardship is placed on the defendant. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(18); 1991 Leg. Ann., supra note 3, at 149.
\textsuperscript{234} N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(b).
\textsuperscript{235} See, e.g., Edith Prentiss, Representative of Disabled In Action, Statement at Hearing of the New York City Council Committee on General Welfare (Sept. 22, 2004) (on file with the Committee):

Another problem is landlords who reject applicants able to pay rent from sources other than a paycheck. Many landlords have a policy against permitting a parent or other relative to co-sign, or be a guarantor on a lease. Reasonable accommodation under existing law should mean that a landlord has to change that policy in the case of a person with a disability. To do so
lar issues, also appropriately requiring accommodation under the local law, were brought up as well:

When someone is able to afford the rent with disability, pension, or other unearned income, they should be allowed to do so, even if the landlord usually requires earned income. When considering whether someone does have enough money to afford an apartment, it is important for landlords to accommodate people with disabilities by converting after-tax income to its larger pre-tax equivalent. The strengthening of the liberal construction provision of the law will help us in these respects as well.\footnote{236}

The example of “converting after-tax income to its larger pre-tax equivalent” represents another circumstance where people with disabilities can be helped, without housing providers being hurt. When a housing provider develops an income requirement, that housing provider is contemplating that the income to be measured will involve pre-tax dollars. The housing provider requires an income of “x” because the housing provider understands that, after taxes, the prospective tenant will only have seventy percent or eighty percent of “x” left over (depending on tax bracket). A person with disabilities who is applying based on post-tax funds does not need the higher gross amount in order to yield the seventy percent or eighty percent “left over” that the housing provider is actually looking for. Converting the post-tax funds of a person with disabilities to their pre-tax equivalent is an accommodation that simply allows apples to be compared with apples.

\section*{iii. No undervaluation of compensatory damages}

Damage awards in the discrimination context have frequently been the subject of reduction, by both trial and appellate courts.\footnote{237}
It is the rare case in which the fact that the injury is a *discrimination injury* is affirmatively treated as placing the harm suffered in the category of “serious injury.” *Broome v. Biondi*, a case involving the discriminatory denial of an application to sublet a co-op apartment, was one such case. There had been limited testimony as to emotional distress. The court’s description is reproduced here in full:

Shannon Broome stated that she felt embarrassed and humiliated by the entire approval process and the ultimate denial of their sublet application. She testified that she felt as if she were experiencing her “worst nightmare.” Shannon Broome was reduced to tears during the June 13th Beekman board interview, and again upon hearing the news that their sublet application had been rejected. She also testified that she was reluctant to tell her husband that the Beekman board rejected their application because she “knew how much it was going to upset him.” Gregory Broome testified that he felt “angry” and “demoralized” by the hostile manner in which he and his wife were treated at the June 13th interview and that “it was difficult for [his] feelings to go away.” He described how he was especially humiliated that he had swallowed his pride and submitted to the board’s interrogation during the June 13th interview without defending himself or his wife. Gregory Broome also stated that his confidence at work was affected by his “fear that clients would somehow not trust [his] advice after they met [him].” Each of the Broomes testified that they had to pass the Beekman Hill House every day to reach a park to walk their dog and were.

*See*, e.g., *Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth. v. New York State Executive Dept’t*, 632 N.Y.S.2d 642, 644 (App. Div. 1995) (purporting to apply these standards to reduce a $30,000 mental anguish award to $7,500 in an age discrimination case conducted before the State Division on Human Rights). Likewise, federal courts have not hesitated to apply the “shocks the judicial conscience test.” *See* *Rainone v. Potter*, 388 F. Supp. 2d 120, 122-23 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). The court reviewed the range within which awards have been constricted and noted:

In the employment discrimination context, there appears to be a ‘spectrum’ or ‘continuum’ of damage awards for emotional distress. . . . At the low end of the continuum are what have become known as ‘garden-variety’ distress claims in which district courts have awarded damages for emotional distress ranging from $5,000 to $35,000. . . . The middle of the spectrum consists of ‘significant’ ($50,000 up to $100,000) and ‘substantial’ emotional distress claims ($100,000). . . . Finally, on the high end of the spectrum are ‘egregious’ emotional distress claims, where the courts have upheld or remitted awards for distress to a sum in excess of $100,000. These awards have only been warranted where the discriminatory conduct was outrageous and shocking or where the physical health of plaintiff was significantly affected.

*Id.* 238. 17 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
reminded constantly of their emotional pain caused by the board’s actions.\textsuperscript{239}

The jury awarded each plaintiff approximately $114,000 in emotional distress damages and $205,000 each in punitive damages. Despite the limited testimony, and despite the absence of medical testimony, the court denied a motion to reduce the awards.\textsuperscript{240} Citing what the court described as “illuminating” research on the serious,\textsuperscript{241} ongoing costs of discrimination, the court concluded that:

In the face of persistent housing discrimination which continues unabated some 30 years after Congress passed the Fair Housing Act to stamp out decades of such discriminatory behavior, the genuine emotional pain associated with such discrimination should not be devalued by unreasonably low compensatory damage awards, especially when one considers the difficulty a plaintiff faces in establishing that he or she was a victim of housing discrimination.\textsuperscript{242}

The Restoration Act echoes \textit{Broome’s} message that the genuine pain associated with discrimination claims should not be undervalued. The City Human Rights Law’s purposes are said to be not only uniquely broad, they are “uniquely broad \textit{and remedial}.”\textsuperscript{243} One of the core principles intended by the Council to guide decision makers is that “victims of discrimination suffer serious injuries, for which they ought to receive full compensation.”\textsuperscript{244}

There are two possibilities to explain the frequency with which verdicts are reduced: one is that judges need to be vigilant to guard against the possibility of juries rendering awards without an adequate evidentiary basis that injury has been suffered; the other is that juries recognize, in a way that most judges are unwilling to, that exposure to discrimination is itself—without more—a serious dignitary injury. Put another way, the vigilance-against-excessiveness school does not assign any baseline value to the insult to dignity itself; the (much smaller) vigilance-against-unreasonably-low-awards school does so. The Restoration Act stands with the latter

\textsuperscript{239} Id. at 223 (transcript references omitted).
\textsuperscript{240} Id. at 223-24 (citing, \textit{inter alia}, to cases that had upheld mental anguish awards of $150,000, $250,000, $450,000, and $500,000). Both plaintiffs’ lawyers and discrimination defense lawyers would agree that these sustained awards represent the exception to the rule.
\textsuperscript{241} Id. at 225 n.9.
\textsuperscript{242} Id. at 226 (citations omitted).
\textsuperscript{243} Restoration Act, \textit{supra} note 7, § 7 amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-130.
\textsuperscript{244} 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, \textit{supra} note 22, at 5.
camp, and thus counsels judges to defer more to a jury’s consideration of the nature of the discrimination injury.

3. **Resisting the urge to import exemptions not set forth in the local law**

   i. **Disparate impact claims in the age discrimination context**

   The Supreme Court concluded in *Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi* that “the scope of disparate-impact liability under the [ADEA] is narrower than under Title VII.” One reason for this is that the ADEA, unlike Title VII, has a provision insulating from disparate-impact liability employer decisions based on a reasonable factor other than age. The other reason cited by the Court is the way that Congress legislatively overruled *Ward’s Cove*, a case which had, *inter alia*, introduced requirements that made it significantly more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in disparate impact cases. When Congress rejected major aspects of the Court’s disparate impact holding, it did so by amending Title VII, the statute that the Supreme Court had been interpreting in *Ward’s Cove*. The Supreme Court in *Smith* seized on the fact that Congress had not amended the ADEA as evidence that Congress had implicitly endorsed the continued use of the disparate impact standards of *Ward’s Cove* in the age discrimination context.

   The City Human Rights Law, on the other hand, has no “reasonable factor of other than age” provision that limits its age discrimination coverage. Moreover, it has an independent, distinct, post-*Ward’s Cove* provision governing disparate impact claims and the burdens of proof relating thereto. That provision covers all types of discrimination, including age, without qualification. Restrictions on disparate impact claims applicable to the ADEA cannot, therefore, be said to be applicable to the City Human Rights Law.

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246. Id. at 1544 (plurality opinion).
247. Id.
249. *Smith*, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45. While Congress would have been aware that courts frequently analogize between and among different discrimination laws, the normal judicial practice is to import good law, not rejected doctrine. As such, the idea that Congress would have thought that it was necessary to act separately to amend the ADEA is curious, to say the least; it certainly does not reflect liberal construction principles.
250. See *N.Y.C. Admin. Code* § 8-107(1).
ii. Housing providers must make and pay for accommodations

Under the Fair Housing Act, as amended in 1988, housing providers only need to *permit* a person with a disability to make reasonable modifications to existing premises. The modifications are to be made at the expense of the person with a disability. When the City Human Rights Law was amended in 1991, it used quite different language. In language directed at all covered entities (housing providers, employers, etc.), it required covered entities to “make” reasonable accommodations. It did not include a provision requiring the person with a disability to pay for the modifications. On the contrary, its distinctive accommodation provision treats *all* accommodations that assist a person with a disability to enjoy the housing or other right in question as reasonable, unless and until the covered entity demonstrates that the accommodation would pose an undue hardship.

Where a covered entity is able to demonstrate that making and paying for a modification would cause it undue hardship, that covered entity is not required to pay for the modification. Restricting the law by judicial construction to allow covered entities to shirk their obligation to pay for accommodation where to do so would not cause an undue hardship would be contrary to the choices made by the City Council.

253. *Id.*
254. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(15)(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, 162-63. The City law uses the term “accommodation” to refer both to “accommodations” and “modifications.” *See* United Veterans Mutual Housing No. 2 Corp. v. N.Y.C. Comm’n on Human Rights, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 2, 1992, at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 616 N.Y.S.2d 84 (App. Div. 1994) (affirming an order of the Human Rights Commission to a housing provider to establish a policy by which it would make and pay for all accommodations, including common area modifications such as the installation and maintenance of ramps, except where doing so would cause undue hardship and noting that the 1991 Amendments mooted the challenge to the Commission’s interpretation by explicitly adopting the Commission’s interpretation). The use of the single term “accommodation” is a reflection of the fact that different contexts of discrimination (housing, employment, and public accommodations) are covered by the one provision. Note that even under federal law, physical modifications to the workplace are contemplated by the reasonable accommodation provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(a) (2005).
255. *See* N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(18) (“The term ‘reasonable accommodation’ means such accommodation that can be made that shall not cause undue hardship in the conduct of the covered entity’s business. The covered entity shall have the burden of proving undue hardship”).
256. It should be noted that, in 2003, the Bloomberg Administration attempted to cut back the scope of the law so that housing providers would only be responsible for paying for modifications to common areas, not individual units. Its proposed amend-
Damages are available for both impact and mixed motive violations

Under Title VII, damages are not permitted to be awarded against defendants who have been found to have engaged in disparate impact violations. Likewise, where a plaintiff has demonstrated an intentional discriminatory practice that was unlawfully motivated, and the defendant has demonstrated that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible mitigating factor, no damages may be awarded.

The City Human Rights Law, by contrast, contains neither restriction. As to disparate impact, the 1991 Amendments treated disparate impact violations merely as one type of violation to be codified in the “unlawful discriminatory practices” section of the law. At the same time, it re-codified the section of the law dealing with the relief that could be ordered by the Commission after a hearing which found that “any unlawful discriminatory practice has occurred.” While making some changes—like specifying the ability of the Commission to order a coop to approve a coop sale—it left intact the provision that permits the award of “compensatory damages to the person aggrieved by such practice.” The phrase “such practice” refers unmistakably to “any unlawful discriminatory practice,” without limitation.

Similarly, a judicial cause of action was defined by the 1991 Amendments to be one “for damages, including punitive damages, and for injunctive relief and such other remedies as may be appropriate . . . .” The cause of action was available to anyone claimed to be aggrieved “by an unlawful discriminatory practice defined in chapter one of this title.” Disparate impact violations are one such practice so defined. Again, no exclusion was placed on the availability of damages.

259. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (“Unlawful Discriminatory Practices”); Id.§ 8-107(17) (defining when an “unlawful discriminatory practice based on disparate impact” is established).
260. Section 8-120(a) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York was replaced with section 8-109(2)(c). See 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 166, 172.
261. Id. The compensatory damages provision is found at section 8-120(a)(7) of the Administrative Code of New York.
262. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 177.
263. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 177.
Just as the 1991 Amendments did not exclude damages in the disparate impact context, the Amendments did not exclude them in the context of a covered entity which proved that it would have taken the same action complained of, even in the absence of an impermissible motive. Naturally, a defendant’s demonstration that it would have taken the same action against a plaintiff even in the absence of an impermissible motive will operate to limit or exclude some types of damages (e.g., backpay) in most circumstances. Rather than being seen as a bar to all damages, however, that demonstration is properly seen under the City Human Rights Law as a factor to be considered in parsing and mitigating the damages to be awarded.

The Commission on Human Rights did so in one of the few mixed motive cases it decided.\textsuperscript{264} The Commission held that the legitimate motives could be taken into account when fashioning the remedy, but, explicitly contrasting its view of the City Law with that of Title VII, ruled that a flat prohibition of damages was inappropriate. Taking the view that “[a]n employee’s egregious conduct... does not justify an employer’s unlawful discrimination,” the Commission awarded mental anguish damages to a complainant who had been on the receiving end of an explicitly bigoted epithet closely linked to his discharge.\textsuperscript{265} Refusing to exclude damages is a conclusion consistent with the Restoration Act’s concern that every discrimination injury be treated as a serious injury.\textsuperscript{266}

In terms of punitive damages (and civil penalties to be awarded administratively), the City Human Rights Law has had since 1991 an explicit mechanism by which such damages or penalties may be mitigated.\textsuperscript{267} Mitigation is not elimination, however. A defen-
dant’s persistence in a policy that it knows or should know has a distinctly disparate impact, where it has not bothered to examine less discriminatory alternatives that are available, may well be one circumstance where some punitives damages or civil penalties should be awarded. Likewise, in a mixed motive context, the intentionally discriminatory features of a candidate selection process are not retroactively insulated from blameworthiness by the fact that the ultimate result was not altered by the impermissible considerations.

4. No further rollback
   i. Continuing to cover acts of post-acquisition harassment

   The doctrine that the Fair Housing Act does not or may not cover acts of post-acquisition conduct was invented by Judge Posner in 2004.\footnote{268} The ruling was made in the face of HUD Regulations in effect since 1989 (that is, at the time of the adoption both of the 1991 Amendments and of the Restoration Act), which included on its list of “terms and conditions” those violations which occur after a property has been acquired by sale or lease.\footnote{269} Specifically, the regulations have prohibited failing or delaying maintaining or repairing a dwelling,\footnote{270} and limiting the “use of privileges, services or facilities associated with a dwelling.”\footnote{271}

   *Halprin* and its progeny were specifically cited in testimony to the Council as an illustration of potential weakening of federal law against which the Restoration Act would protect the local law.\footnote{272} The idea that a covered entity would be permitted to harass an existing tenant because of protected class is utterly repugnant to the City Human Rights Law’s broad and inclusive proscriptions on discrimination, and could not properly be imported.\footnote{273}

\footnote{268. Halpin v. Prairie Single Family Homes, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004).} \footnote{269. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65 (2005).} \footnote{270. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(2) (2005).} \footnote{271. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(4) (2005).} \footnote{272. See Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 3; Brennan Statement, supra note 23, at 7 (“The independent construction provision would provide a buffer against the application of the doctrines to the City’s Human Rights Law, and would help advocates argue against any other ratcheting down of the local law based on narrowed understandings of state and federal civil rights law.”).} \footnote{273. For an extended discussion of why *Halprin* is “problematic,” “anomalous,” and “clearly wrong,” even in terms of federal law, see ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION, LAW AND LITIGATION 14 §§ 9-22 (2005).}
ii. Preserving broad organizational standing

In 1982, the Supreme Court ruled in *Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman*\(^\text{274}\) that the Fair Housing Act had “conferred on all ‘persons’ a legal right to truthful information about available housing,” without regard to race.\(^\text{275}\) This principle was used in *Havens* to grant standing to “testers” (persons who act in an investigatory capacity for a fair housing organization, but who have no actual intention to secure the property being viewed)\(^\text{276}\) but is not limited to testers alone. The definition of “person” in the Fair Housing Act, like the City Human Rights Law, is broad, and encompasses a corporation,\(^\text{277}\) the usual form of not-for-profit fair housing organization.

A corporation, of course, can only act through its agents.\(^\text{278}\) As such, a fair housing not-for-profit seeks information through its agents (testers), and is itself deprived of truthful information about available housing in violation of the *Havens* rule if its agents are so deprived because of protected class status.\(^\text{279}\)

This result is the only one consistent with Congress’ intent. Rather than relying on government prosecutions alone, “Congress created this right so that private persons could enforce the statute as private attorneys general without running afoul of Article III.”\(^\text{280}\) Private fair housing organizations are the “persons” best suited to play the contemplated private attorneys general role. Indeed, in 1992, as part of the Housing and Community Development Act, Congress found, *inter alia*, that “their proven efficacy of private nonprofit fair housing enforcement organizations and com-

\(^{274}\) 455 U.S. 363 (1982).

\(^{275}\) Id. at 373 (emphasis supplied; internal quotation in original).

\(^{276}\) Id.

\(^{277}\) 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d) (2005); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(1). The 1991 Amendments broadened the City Law’s definition of “person” in a number of ways, including the addition of “organizations” within its ambit. See 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 4, at 145.

\(^{278}\) William Meade Fletcher, 2 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 434 (2005) (“That a corporation can act only through agents is too elementary a proposition to require the citation of authority.”).

\(^{279}\) In *Havens* itself, the fair housing organization based its own claim for standing, and it was granted on the grounds that the defendant’s conduct has forced it into a “diversion of resources” and had caused “frustration of mission.” *Havens*, 455 U.S. at 378-80. The fact that fair housing organizations have thereafter fit their cases into a “diversion of resources” or “frustration of mission” box does not alter the availability of standing under *Havens* for all ‘persons’ discriminatorily denied truthful information.

\(^{280}\) Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th Cir. 1990).
munity-based efforts makes support for these organizations a necessary component of the fair housing enforcement system.**281**

Unlike the tester—who is but an agent of the testing organization, who acquires information only for the testing organization, and who may have only a transitory participation in fair housing work—a testing organization is the tester’s principal, has ongoing participation in fair housing work and is the ultimate recipient of the information (or misinformation) about housing availability. The testing organization, therefore, has an even stronger claim to standing than does the tester.

It would surprise no one if the Supreme Court someday soon were to cut back on a broad standing decision of a very different 1982 Supreme Court. But the City Human Rights Law should not be cut back in tandem. Even before the 1991 Amendments, the City Human Rights Law had been interpreted by the Commission on Human Rights to have intended the broadest possible standing. Citing *Trafficante* and *Havens*, the Commission concluded that, just as the Supreme Court had ruled that Congress had intended “to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution,”**282** the City Human Rights Law echoes this construction by the inclusion of [language] which provides that this title ‘shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof.’**283**

Because the kind of analysis engaged in by *Trafficante* and *Havens* broadly considered an all-encompassing anti-discrimination goal, that analysis can usefully be seen “as a floor below which the City Human Rights Law cannot fall.”**284** Moreover, the issue of maintaining broad standing was specifically put before the Council in testimony and statements as one of the goals and consequences of passing the Restoration Act.**285** Regardless of what the Supreme

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284. *See Restoration Act, supra* note 7, § 1.
285. *See Center Testimony, supra* note 23, at 4 (“We will be able to protect against the time when federal courts cut back on standing for testers and for fair housing organizations.”); *see also* Brennan Center Statement, *supra* note 23, at 7 (“Rather than being reactive—waiting, for example, until after the Supreme Court cuts back on...
Court comes to do, both testers and fair housing organizations should be found to have standing under the City Human Rights Law for the discriminatory deprivation of truthful information regarding available housing.

5. Overcoming the inhibition effect

Civil rights advocates have been on the defensive for so long that it is sometimes hard to imagine that fruitful new legal territory is available to be utilized. The Restoration Act is both a response to advocates who sought new momentum in the fight against discrimination, and a call to others to take up this fight with renewed vigor. The illustrations discussed below each arise from statutory language, or were referenced in testimony in the course of consideration of the Restoration Act.

i. Discrimination in the delivery of City services

The assertion is frequently made that there are gross disparities in the delivery of City services (and in the burden of City infrastructure) depending on the neighborhood in which one lives. Because New York City is so highly segregated, such neighborhood variations would yield strong racial disparities. standing for testers and fair housing organizations, and then waiting further, for the years it frequently takes to achieve a specific legislative restoration—Intro 22 will provide a means of preventing such dismantling of New York City’s civil rights protections from occurring in the first place.”).

286. See NYC Environmental Justice Alliance, http://www.nyceja.org/campaigns.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2006) (“New York City has one of the lowest standards of open space access (acres per 1000 residents) in the United States. . . . 37 of 59 community districts (63%), more than previously thought, are not meeting the standard of 2.5 acres per 1000 residents with regard to access to open space. Of these 37 districts, 24 have the highest number of residents of color (65% or more) and 18 are of the lowest median household income ($16,000-$30,000). These communities are also the one’s [sic] carrying the rest of the City’s environmental burdens from waste transfer stations to power plants.”).


288. The existence of educational segregation, for example, is a direct function of residential segregation. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 329 (1996) (“The school segregation that exists in any given community today shows the enduring ef-
Because the City Human Rights Law defines public accommodations to include a provider of any and all services,289 and because the City is not excluded from that definition,290 the delivery of City services is open to a challenge pursuant to the distinctive disparate impact provisions of the law.291

ii. Limiting the circumstances where punitive damages can be evaded

Under the Kolstad standard, good faith compliance measures that are taken by a covered entity act as a safe harbor against punitive damages under federal law.292 In contrast, the currently operative provision of the City Human Rights Law explicitly provides that such good faith measures only mitigate liability for punitive damages.293 Courts have assumed that other aspects of Kolstad—like the requisite mental state required for the imposition of punitive damages, and who has to have that mental state—are areas where the City Human Rights Law tracks the federal standard.294 In fact, no court has engaged in an independent assessment of whether these aspects of Kolstad actually serve the purposes of the City Human Rights Law.

In terms of the required mental state, Kolstad requires that a defendant have acted in reckless disregard of a perceived risk that

289. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9).
290. On the contrary, the Committee Report accompanying the 1991 Amendments pointed out the City schools would be covered by the public accommodations provision. See 1991 COMMITTEE REPORT ANALYSIS, supra note 81, at 4 (“The amendment would also eliminate the current exclusion of public libraries, schools, colleges, and other educational institutions. . . . Although a variety of other laws . . . cover certain aspects of discrimination . . . the City has an independent and overriding interest in routing out discrimination from its schools.”).
293. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(13)(e).
294. E.g., Farias v. Instructional Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2001) (federal law is not adopted where City law (as in the case of mitigation of punitives) has explicitly adopted a standard different from the federal standard, but federal law is adopted where City law is silent).
its actions will violate civil rights law.\textsuperscript{295} Given the City Human Rights Law's overriding concern that covered entities be made to recognize the seriousness with which they must take their obligations, advocates will likely question why a defendant who recklessly disregards the risk that its conduct will harm the plaintiff should not, as a matter of local law, be liable for punitive damages.\textsuperscript{296} Such conduct is blameworthy regardless of whether the defendant is disregarding, as required by \textit{Kolstad}, a known risk of violating the law.\textsuperscript{297}

In terms of \textit{who} must possess the requisite culpable mental state, \textit{Kolstad} limits the class for federal law purposes to managerial employees.\textsuperscript{298} Restricting the universe of those for whom an employer may be held liable in punitive damages to managerial employees, however, is a restriction contrary to the choice made by the City Human Rights Law. The vicarious liability provisions do not by their terms exclude any type of damages from the application of the principle of vicarious responsibility.\textsuperscript{299} Moreover, the employer in the housing or public accommodations context become automatically liable based on the conduct of the employee or agent, without limitation.\textsuperscript{300} The employer in the workplace context becomes automatically liable based on the conduct of the employee or agent who exercises supervisory or managerial authority, without limitation.\textsuperscript{301} These provisions reflect an overriding concern of the City Human Rights Law that employers are obliged to take all reasonable steps to prevent their employees and agents from discriminating. The potential of having punitive damages im-

\textsuperscript{295} \textit{Kolstad}, 527 U.S. at 536.

\textsuperscript{296} Where a defendant \textit{intends} that its conduct harm the plaintiff, of course, the question of reckless disregard does not come into play, and punitive damages are properly founded on a theory of malice. \textit{Kolstad} did nothing to upset that aspect of the law. \textit{Id.} (describing recklessness as an alternative to a showing of malice or “evil motive or intent”).

\textsuperscript{297} This issue was brought to the Council’s attention through the testimony of the Anti-Discrimination Center. \textit{See} Center Testimony, \textit{supra} note 23, at 4.

\textsuperscript{298} \textit{Kolstad}, 527 U.S. at 542-43 (noting that a managerial employee must be an “important” employee). Of course, when the employer itself participates in harassment, where the discriminatory acts are quintessentially employer acts, or where the participant is sufficiently high in the employer’s organization to be considered an alter ego of the employer, the employer is more properly said to directly liable. \textit{Faragher}, 524 U.S. at 788-90. Direct liability analysis can extend to the imposition of punitive damages. \textit{Cf.} Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Svcs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 2000) (company directly liable in punitives because of reckless indifference on the part of the employee it designated to respond to complaints of discrimination).

\textsuperscript{299} \textit{See} N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(13)(a), (b), and (c).

\textsuperscript{300} \textit{See id.} § 8-107(13)(a).

\textsuperscript{301} \textit{See id.} § 8-107(13)(b)(1).
posed based solely on the mental state of the employee gives the employer added incentive not only to disseminate anti-discrimination policies, but to make sure they are effectively policed.\textsuperscript{302}

**PART II: THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE RESTORATION ACT**

Though the need for broad and independent interpretation of the City Human Rights Law was of paramount importance in drafting the Restoration Act, there are specific changes rendered by the Act that are themselves of great importance.

A. Retaliation

The Second Circuit’s “materiality” standard for an action to be adverse is rejected. The Restoration Act provides that retaliation:

need not result in an ultimate action with respect to employment, housing or a public accommodation or in a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment, housing, or a public accommodation, provided, however, that the retaliatory or discriminatory act or acts complained of must be reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in protected activity.\textsuperscript{303}"

The Committee Report explicitly states that the amendment:

would make clear that the standard to be applied to retaliation claims under the City’s differs from the standard currently applied by the Second Circuit in retaliation claims made pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; it is in line with the standard set out in guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and applied to retaliation claims by federal courts in several other circuits.\textsuperscript{304}

The EEOC Guidelines take the position that the “degree of harm suffered by the individual ‘goes to the issue of damages, not liability.’”\textsuperscript{305} The Guidelines explain the policy reasons for this

\textsuperscript{302} The local law’s emphasis of maximizing effective policing of policies is reflected in the fact that the “good faith” factors for mitigation of punitive damages specify that the required policies must be policies for the prevention “and detection” of discrimination. \textit{Id.} § 8-107(13)(d)(1). One such policy that is specified is one that has “[p]rocedures for the supervision of employees and agents and for the oversight of persons employed as independent contractors specifically directed at the prevention and detection of [discriminatory] practices.” \textit{Id.} § 8-107(13)(d)(1)(iv) (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{303} Restoration Act, \textit{supra} note 7, § 3, amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(7).

\textsuperscript{304} 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, \textit{supra} note 22, at 3.

\textsuperscript{305} 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8, 13 (1998) (internal citation omitted), available at eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.pdf.
view in terms remarkably similar to those that animated the Restoration Act:

This broad view of coverage accords with the primary purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions, which is to "maintained unfeathered access to statutory remedial mechanisms." Regardless of the degree or quality of harm to the particular complainant, retaliation harms the public interest by deterring others from filing a charge. An interpretation of Title VII that permits some forms of retaliation to go unpunished would undermine the effectiveness of the EEOC statutes and conflict with the language and purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions.\(^{306}\)

As such, many manifestations of retaliation that would not necessarily meet a materiality standard, do meet the EEOC test. The Committee Report that accompanied the Restoration Act noted that "lateral transfers, unfavorable job references, and change in work schedules" would be among the conduct that would be actionable under the test contemplated by the Restoration Act.\(^{307}\)

When construing the enhanced retaliation provision, it is important to remember that the 1991 Amendments had already sought to broaden coverage by adding to the then-existing anti-retaliation section a phrase that attempted to make clear that it was illegal to retaliate "in any manner."\(^{308}\) Combined with the policy grounds for the EEOC’s position, cited with approval by the 2005 Committee Report, as well as with the Restoration Act’s own goal to ensure "that New York City does everything within its power to identify and root out discrimination,"\(^{309}\) it is clear that the Restoration Act’s “reasonably likely to deter” standard is intended to cover a very wide range of conduct.

There may well be some types of conduct, which, if examined without regard to chilling effect, might not, at first blush, seem more than trivial. But a useful question to be posed is this: “What would happen if the policy manual of the covered entity being sued had stated that opposition to discrimination would be responded to by the retaliatory conduct that the covered entity was proved to

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306. Id. at 8-15 (internal citations omitted).
307. 2005 Committee Report, supra note 22, at 3 n.4, (citing a review of the state of the law in Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1241-43 (9th Cir. 2000)). Another case cited in Ray found that an employer’s “cancellation of a public event honoring an employee” could constitute actionable conduct. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1242.
have engaged in?” If the response publicized were simply that the employee’s supervisor would be less effusively friendly for a few days, it is not likely that any employees would be deterred from opposing discrimination in the future. But, if the “full advance disclosure of retaliation” manual explained that the cost of opposing discrimination would be the loss of all future social intercourse with other employees, the workplace reality would be that some people—indeed, many people—would become less likely to oppose discrimination than they otherwise would be. And the chilling effect would take place even in the absence of any fear of discharge, demotion, transfer, or poor references. The need to make a real world evaluation of how a particular type of conduct (in particular circumstances) would be perceived is another case where the determination is best suited to a jury after trial, not to a judge on a summary judgment motion.

**B. Domestic Partnership**

The Restoration Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of “partnership status” across all contexts of discrimination covered by the City Human Rights Law. “Partnership status” means the status of being in a “domestic partnership,” as that term is already defined under New York City law. An individual can be in a domestic partnership, and thus have partnership status, as can a couple. The 2005 Committee Report specifically states that “life partners” and others who are domestic partners under New York City law are to “receive protection from all forms of discrimination addressed by the human rights law, just as married partners do.”

Health insurance and other employer-provided benefits are clearly “terms, conditions or privileges of employment,” and, hence, the terms of the operative provision of the City Human Rights Law are applicable to a covered entity’s refusal to provide such insurance or benefits to domestic partners. Claims will undoubtedly be made that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempts the local law in this one respect. It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt to resolve the preemp-

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310. It is worth noting here that it is only where a covered entity has intentionally taken some action against a plaintiff because of opposition to discrimination, and the plaintiff has proven that a causal link exists between the opposition and the action in response, that a defendant faces liability.

311. 2005 Committee Report, supra note 22, at 2-3 (emphasis added).
tion question, but the way that City Law itself handles the question is instructive.

The 1991 Amendments provided that the employment discrimination provisions as they related to employee benefit plans “shall not be construed to preclude an employer from observing the requirements of [an ERISA plan] that is in compliance with applicable federal discrimination laws where the application of [the City Law provision] would be preempted by such act.” On one level, this language may seem unnecessary: if there were federal preemption, that preemption would operate regardless of whether a state or local statute explicitly referenced it. On another level, however, the provision demonstrates that City Law made a conscious choice to go as far as permissible. The only limit being imposed was any limit that existed by the operation of preemption, and no additional limitation should be inferred.

C. Catalyst Case Fees

_Buckhannon_ is rejected for City Human Rights Law purposes. As amended, section 8-502(f) of the New York City Human Rights Law specifies that a prevailing party who may be awarded costs and fees “includes a plaintiff whose commencement of litigation has acted as a catalyst to effect policy change on the part of the defendant, regardless of whether that change has been implemented voluntarily, as a result of a settlement or as a result of a judgment in such plaintiff’s favor.” The change is another example of the Council wanting to make certain that the law in no way discourages individuals and organizations from playing a vigorous private attorney general role.

312. Given that the City Human Rights Law does not seek to specify the substance of coverage to be provided, does not seek to regulate the administration of the benefits program, and does not cause a burden to plan administrators, one would imagine that the argument against section 1144 preemption to be strong. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2005).

313. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(e)(i) (emphasis added); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 152.


315. Restoration Act, supra note 8, amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(f); see also 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at n.10 (citing the dissent of Justice Ginsburg in Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 627-28, and explaining that an analysis of the entitlement to costs and fees in a catalyst case can be based “on a three part analysis, which requires: (1) that the respondent provide at least some of the benefit sought by the lawsuit; (2) that the suit stated a genuine claim; and (3) that the suit was a substantial or significant cause of the act providing the relief”).
D. Civil Penalties

When civil penalties were introduced to the City Human Rights Law in 1991, they were designed to vindicate the public interest, and were available up to $50,000 even where there had been no showing of willfulness or maliciousness, and up to $100,000 where there had been such a showing. A problem that emerged was that the caps were too low to achieve their purpose of vindicating the public interest. In a case of harassment of a person with AIDS several years ago, the appellate court reduced the Commission-imposed civil penalty from $75,000 to $25,000, even though it believed that the defendant had acted abhorrently. Nevertheless, because the landlord was not one of the City’s largest, the court cut the penalty. The pre-Restoration Act caps thus acted not only to prevent adequate punishment of larger wrongdoers; they also worked to ratchet down penalties for smaller wrongdoers below what is appropriate.

The Restoration Act raises the caps to $125,000 without a showing of willfulness or maliciousness, and to $250,000 with such a showing. The Council intended that these higher civil penalties reflect the fact that all acts of discrimination cause serious injury both to the individual victim and to the City, and that these higher penalties will demonstrate that discrimination “will not be tolerated.”

The fact that the caps were more than doubled should also be a factor in restraining judges who might otherwise be inclined to reduce punitive damage awards in cases brought in court. A 250 percent increase in penalties available administratively strongly suggests that it is actually the award of “inadequate penalties” that is the key problem about which courts need to worry. Likewise, the Council’s emphasis on the societal injury caused by discrimination should make judges skeptical that punitive awards are excessive. Punitive damages can only meet the law’s goals of punishment, individual deterrence, and general deterrence if they are sufficient to “sting.”

316. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-126(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 174.
318. Id.
320. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 6.
321. Id.
There are what purport to be constitutional limitations on the size of punitive damage awards.\textsuperscript{322} One of the factors to be considered in “due process excessiveness” analysis is a comparison of the punitive damages awarded with the civil penalties available for similar conduct. In \textit{BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore}, the case that established the factors cited by \textit{State Farm}, there was a $2,000,000 punitive damage award.\textsuperscript{323} That award represented an amount one thousand times the maximum civil penalty that could have been imposed by the state’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act, a ratio that the Court found to be strongly indicative of excessiveness.\textsuperscript{324} Under the City Human Rights Law as revised by the Restoration Act, by contrast, that $2,000,000 punitive damage award would only represent an amount eight times the amount that can now be imposed administratively.\textsuperscript{325} Both in terms of conveying the seriousness with which the City views discriminatory conduct, and by reducing the ratio between maximum civil penalties on the one hand and punitive damage awards measured in the millions of dollars on the other, the Restoration Act has made larger punitive damage awards more sustainable.

\textbf{E. Thorough Investigations}

Citing a report on the City’s failure to enforce its Human Rights Law,\textsuperscript{326} the Council imposed a requirement that the administrative investigations of the Commission on Human Rights be “thor-

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\textsuperscript{322} See \textit{State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell}, 538 U.S. 408, 418, 425 (2003) (Internal citations omitted) (To determine whether a punitive damage award is excessive and violates the Due Process Clause, it is necessary to consider three factors, the most important of which is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; also to be considered is “the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award,” although a greater ratio may be necessary where the “monetary value of noneconomic harms might have been difficult to determine”; and, lastly, “the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”). \textit{But see id.} at 430-31 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (“It was not until 1996 . . . that the Court, for the first time, invalidated a state-court punitive damages assessment as unreasonably large. . . . If our activity in this domain is now “well established” [as claimed by the majority], it takes place on ground not long held.”).
\textsuperscript{324} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{325} Restoration Act, \textit{supra} note 7, § 6.
\textsuperscript{326} See 2005 \textit{COMMITTEE REPORT}, \textit{supra} note 22, at 4 n.5 (citing \textsc{Craig Gurian, Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York, At the Crossroads: Is There Hope for Civil Rights Law Enforcement in New York?} 6-10 (2003), \textit{available at} \texttt{www.antibiaslaw.com/crossroads.pdf}.
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ough." Among the many problems that the report had found was the fact that the Commission had been engaging “in a process of what might be called ‘asymmetrical skepticism.’”

No probable cause determinations” repeatedly rely on the idea that a complainant has not “rebutted” the contentions of the respondent—contentions generally contained in an answer or position statement prepared by respondent’s counsel. In essence, the Commission will say to an (almost always unrepresented) individual: “Go ahead and disprove what respondent’s counsel has written.” The respondent’s attorney’s position winds up being treated as true unless conclusively proven false by complainant, without that position ever being challenged directly by Commission inquiry.

The Committee Report specified that, in general, the “thorough” investigation requirement “should include steps such as probing the reasons for a respondent’s conduct and actively seeking out facts from witnesses.” As such, the new requirement—in addition to causing the Commission to changes its practices—should mean that state courts reviewing challenges to determinations by the Commission need to be more probing in assessing whether an investigative determination was based on adequate investigation.

**F. Technical Changes**

Even if a complaint had previously been filed with the State Division of Human Rights, the City Human Rights Law had permitted an action to be commenced under its provisions if the State complaint had first been dismissed by the State Division for “administrative convenience.” Subsequent to the 1991 Amendments, the State Human Rights Law was changed to permit an “annulment” of a complainant’s election of remedies. The Restoration Act makes clear that such annulments revive an aggrieved party’s right to bring a claim under the City Human Rights Law as well.

The 1991 Amendments required that, prior to an action being commenced pursuant to the City Human Rights Law, a copy of the complaint had to be filed with the City Commission and with the

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328. GURIAN, supra note 326, at 9.
329. Id.
331. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(b).
332. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(9) (McKinney 2005).
333. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 8, amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(b).
City’s Law Department. The purpose was to make certain that the responsible local institutional entities tasked to fight discrimination would remain apprised of (and potentially intervene in) claims of discrimination. Courts have understood that the purpose was not to create a jurisdictional barrier.\(^{334}\) The Restoration Act modifies the provision to permit the serving of copies of the complaints on the agencies within ten days after the commencement of a civil action, and requires the agencies to designate a representative to receive the complaints.\(^{335}\) The use of the term “serve” was not and is not intended to convey a technical meaning. The purpose is that the complaint is received by the agencies, regardless of the means used.\(^{336}\)

**PART III: ADDITIONAL ISSUES FOR IMMEDIATE RESOLUTION**

**A. Retroactivity**

The Restoration Act has no explicit retroactivity provision; it says only that it is to take effect immediately upon enactment.\(^{337}\) Nevertheless, New York’s Court of Appeals balances two axioms of statutory interpretation in making a determination about retroactivity:

Amendments are presumed to have prospective application unless the Legislature’s preference for retroactivity is explicitly stated or clearly indicated. However, remedial legislation should be given retroactive effect in order to effectuate its beneficial purpose. Other factors in the retroactivity analysis include whether the Legislature has made a specific pronouncement about retroactive effect or conveyed a sense of urgency; whether the statute was designed to rewrite an unintended judicial interpretation; and whether the enactment itself reaffirms a legislative judgment about what the law in question should be.\(^{338}\)

Two of the Restoration Act’s provisions are entirely new, and thus will have prospective application only. These are the provision adding domestic partnership as a new basis of protected class status, and the provision increasing the maximum civil penalties

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336. Hence, it is contemplated that delivering the copy of the complaint by mail or by overnight delivery service is permissible, without a party first having attempted in-person delivery.
that can be awarded in the administrative context.\textsuperscript{339} The rest of the provisions, on the other hand, are appropriately applied retroactively.\textsuperscript{340}

The two areas of the Restoration Act where retroactivity will be contested are the retaliation provision and the enhanced liberal construction provision. In both cases, the Restoration Act was “designed to rewrite an unintended judicial interpretation” and “reaffirms a legislative judgment about what the law in question should be.”\textsuperscript{341} The Restoration Act and its legislative history are replete with references to the need for clarification and reaffirmation.\textsuperscript{342} The text of the Act itself states that “it is the sense of the Council that New York City’s Human Rights Law has been construed too narrowly to ensure protection of all persons covered by the law.”\textsuperscript{343} The 2005 Committee Report states that the Act “aims to ensure construction of the City’s Human Rights Law in line with the purposes of fundamental amendments to the law enacted in 1991.”\textsuperscript{344}

Specifically with respect to retaliation, the 2005 Committee Report states that the point of the amendment is “to clarify the standard.”\textsuperscript{345} This clarifying intention is highlighted specifically by the fact that the 1991 Amendments had already attempted to broaden coverage by prohibiting retaliation “in any manner.”\textsuperscript{346} Here, as in \textit{Gleason}, “the legislative history establishes that the purpose of the amendment was to clarify what the law was always meant to do and say.”\textsuperscript{347}

A covered entity that has taken negative action against a person prior to the effective date of the Restoration Act cannot be heard to complain of retroactive application on the ground that the retaliation did not rise to the “materiality standard.” Such conduct not only comes under the local law’s 1991 “in any manner” language, it

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\item[339] Where conduct that predates the effective date of the Restoration Act continues on after the effective date, of course, the higher maximums apply.
\item[340] Retroactivity in terms of the filing provisions and the requirement of “thorough” investigations is routine, and does not warrant discussion.
\item[341] \textit{In re} Gleason, 96 N.Y.2d at 122.
\item[342] In both cases, the law conveys a sense of urgency as well. Unlike the 1991 Amendments, which the Council clearly had in view, the Restoration Act does not contain any deferring language. \textit{See} 1991 Amendments, supra note 3, § 4; 1991 \textit{Leg. Ann.}, supra note 3, at 180 (setting forth deferred application of some provisions, and explicitly stating that several others were to be applied prospectively only).
\item[343] Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 1.
\item[345] \textit{Id.} at 3.
\item[347] \textit{In re} Gleason, 96 N.Y.2d at 122.
\end{footnotes}
is conduct as to which the covered entity had no legitimate or vested interest.\textsuperscript{348}

The enhanced liberal construction provision, of course, has application across the range of all provisions of the local law, and there is no difficulty concluding that the purpose of the provision “was to clarify what the law was always meant to do and say,” at least what it was always meant to do and say after the 1991 Amendments. The 2005 Committee Report, for example, not only states that the Restoration Act “aims to ensure construction of the City’s Human Rights Law in line with the purposes of fundamental amendments to the law enacted in 1991,” it pointedly incorporates Mayor Dinkins’ contemporaneous recitation of the Council’s intent in 1991 to require liberal and independent construction of the law.\textsuperscript{349}

For most provisions of the City Human Rights Law, there was either not a specific interpretation of the language of the City Human Rights Law provision\textsuperscript{350}—let alone one according with the existing liberal construction requirement—or an interpretation rendered by the State Court of Appeals. As such, decisions that henceforth determine what the law properly “was” in respect to these provisions in the period from the 1991 Amendments to the enactment of the Restoration Act would not, in most cases, even involve the “overruling” of a decision of the State’s highest court, but rather would involve either a simple reading of the substantive statutory language or the application of the pre-Restoration Act liberal construction provision. Retroactive application concerning such “under-interpreted” provisions of the City law cannot be said to upset “settled expectations.”

Decisions that have been rendered by the Court of Appeals but have not considered the language or purpose of the City statute not only fail to meet the requirements of amended section 8-130, they failed to meet the liberal construction requirements of the pre-Restoration Act City Human Rights Law. As such, allowing such decisions to govern any proceedings, including proceedings relating to conduct that occurred prior to October 3, 2005, would defeat the

\textsuperscript{348} The argument to the contrary, that covered entities were somehow relying on the materiality loophole, that is, they were justified in trying to take retaliatory action as close to the line as possible, is not a value to be countenanced under the City Human Rights Law. One hopes, in any event, that it will be an argument that induces the Second Circuit to rethink the utility and appropriateness of its own standard.

\textsuperscript{349} 2005 Committee Report, supra note 22, at 2.

\textsuperscript{350} For example, the Court of Appeals in Levin simply did not interpret the “terms and conditions” provision of the statute.
It is important to note that retroactive application cannot seriously be said to impair any “vested interest” of any individual or entity subject to the law. In terms of vicarious liability, for example, a covered entity either did or did not have a vested interest in encouraging, condoning, or furthering harassing conduct by an employee. If it did not, it cannot claim a vested interest in Forrest’s failure to apply the plain language of section 8-107(13)(b)(1) of the New York City Human Rights Law. If the covered entity did have a vested interest in encouraging, condoning, or furthering such harassing conduct, it is in any event liable under existing State Human Rights Law principles, and is not harmed by application of City law liability stemming in any event from 1991 Amendments language.

There is, finally, an important issue of avoiding confusion in the administration of justice that counsels retroactive application. If courts were to begin to decide cases based on old notions of what the law “was”—as opposed to what the Restoration Act clarified the law was intended to be—we will likely be faced with a new series of decisions that fail to engage in the analysis required by the Restoration Act, the routine citation of which will lead to a failure to take the necessary new steps to determine what, post-Restoration Act, the law “is” hereafter supposed to be.

B. Jury Instructions

Developing and promulgating model jury instructions for cases implicating provisions of the City’s Human Rights Law is a task that warrants urgent attention. It is clear that some City Human Rights Law standards already differ from their state and federal counterparts. More will come to differ as judges begin to construe provisions to accomplish the uniquely broad and remedial purposes of the City law. Still others will come to differ as federal law becomes more narrow and, thanks to the Restoration Act, City law resists being ratcheted down. As such, existing instructions need to be thoroughly reviewed: they reflect the carbon copy bias that the Restoration Act seeks to eliminate.

Instructions distinguishing the proof requirements of the City Human Rights Law from those of counterpart civil rights statutes
should not be difficult to develop. Nevertheless, it may be useful to consider the increased use of special interrogatories. Take, for example, a case where Jane Smith alleges that her supervisor, John Jones, sexually harassed her. Smith brings an EEOC charge against her employer, ABC Corporation, but not against Jones, because individuals are not liable under Title VII. After the EEOC fails to investigate her charge in 180 days, plaintiff Smith commences an action in United States District Court for the Eastern or Southern District of New York alleging that ABC violated her rights under Title VII and the City Human Rights Law, and that Jones violated her rights under the latter statute. Because the City Human Rights Law permits individuals to be held responsible for their discriminatory acts, and because there is a common core of operative facts, the federal court assumes supplemental jurisdiction of the City Human Rights Law claim, both as against ABC and as against Jones.

Assume that it has come to be recognized that the City Human Rights Law should not insulate defendants who have engaged in harassment by imposing a “severe or pervasive” hurdle over which to jump, and the alternative formulation suggested earlier in this article has been accepted. Assume as well that the presiding judge has read the strict liability provisions of section 8-107(13)(b)(1). There are basic ways in which instructions relating to the two statutes would need to differ, and for which special interrogatories would be helpful.

The jury would be asked, “Did plaintiff demonstrate that Jones treated her less favorably because of gender?” If the answer were

351. In a case where the retaliation alleged arguably does not meet the federal materiality standard, for example, a judge would point out that the City Human Rights Law claim does not require a showing that the retaliation complained of resulted in an ultimate employment action or a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment, and would further explain that a plaintiff in that circumstance would need to prove that that the retaliatory act or acts complained of were reasonably likely to deter an employee from engaging in protected activity.

352. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(1)(a); see supra notes 75–90 and accompanying text.

353. See supra notes 190–213 and accompanying text for a discussion of the proposal that all harassment should be proscribed except where the covered entity proves as an affirmative defense that the challenged actions “consisted of no more than what a reasonable victim of discrimination would consider petty slights and trivial annoyances.”

354. This illustration also assumes that the evidence only supports a single motive charge. Potential differences in the definition of “supervisor” under the two laws, and a variety of differences relating to the imposition of punitive damages are also among the issues not treated here.
“no,” then judgment would be entered for both defendants on all claims.

If the answer were yes, the jury would be asked, “Did defendants demonstrate that the conduct alleged consisted of merely petty slights or trivial annoyances? If the answer to this question were “yes,” then judgment would be entered for both defendants on all claims.

If the answer to the second question were “no,” then plaintiff would have judgment against Jones on the City Human Rights Law claim.

The third question that the jury would need to answer would be, “Did Smith exercise supervisory responsibility for ABC?” If the answer to this question were “yes,” then plaintiff would have judgment against ABC on the City Human Rights Law claim.

There would only remain questions relating to the Title VII claim against ABC. One relates to whether the conduct alleged was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile environment. If the answer to this question were “no,” then judgment would be entered for ABC on the Title VII claim.

If the answer to the “severe or pervasive” question were “yes,” then a question would need to be posed as to whether defendant had made out both prongs of the Faragher/Ellerth defense. A “yes” answer from the jury would yield judgment for ABC on the Title VII claim; an answer of “no” would yield judgment for plaintiff against ABC on the Title VII claim.

Special interrogatories such as these will make it simpler for juries (and judges) to navigate the variety of different standards set out by City, State, and federal civil rights law.

Conclusion

There may well be those who say that the 1991 Amendments and the Restoration Act represent a series of policy choices that are distinctly too plaintiff-friendly; that are insufficiently attentive to the needs of covered entities; and that rely too much on a law enforcement model of detect, punish, and deter. In her or his private life, a judge is free to vote for City Council candidates who would make different policy choices. In the meantime, the only lawful and responsible course of judicial action is to respect the policy choices that have been made. These choices respect and honor the unique ability of judges to take center stage in the advance of social justice by the simple and profound task of giving “thoughtful, independent consideration” to what interpretation would best ful-
“the uniquely broad and remedial purposes of the City’s Human Rights Law.”

The fact that few have thus far awakened to the potential of the City Human Rights Law in the fifteen years since this passage of the 1991 Amendments must not and does not change this obligation. It remains a sad fact of our history that Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes went unenforced for many decades. Yet, as a Supreme Court that finally recognized its obligation to give life to Section 1982 wrote: “The fact that the statute lay partially dormant for many years cannot be held to diminish its force today.”

355. 2005 Committee Report, supra note 22, at 5 n.8.